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Abstract
We investigate dynamic coordination among members of a problem solving team who re-
ceive private signals about which of their actions are required for a (static) coordinated
solution and who have repeated opportunities to explore different action combinations. In
this environment ordinal equilibria, in which agents condition only on how their signals
rank their actions and not on signal strength, lead to simple patterns of behavior that
have a natural interpretation as routines. These routines partially solve the team’s coor-
dination problem by synchronizing the team’s search efforts and prove to be resilient to
changes in the environment by being ex post equilibria, to agents having only a coarse
understanding of other agents’ strategies by being fully cursed, and to natural forms of
agents’ overconfidence. The price of this resilience is that optimal routines are frequently
not optimal equilibria.
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1 Introduction
We investigate dynamic coordination among members of a problem solving team who receive
private signals about which of their actions are required for a (static) coordinated solution and
who have repeated opportunities to explore different action combinations. Our model is a stylized
representation of the task faced by a team of nurses and doctors treating a new patient,1 by a
firm’s marketing and engineering divisions when launching a new product, by different faculty
supervising a student’s PhD thesis etc. One characteristic common to these examples is the
recurrence of similar albeit not identical problems, making it plausible that the team develops
a routine to address them. We investigate the nature of such routines, ask when they may arise
and how successful they are at helping to solve the team’s problems.
We show that the set of equilibria of the game that we investigate can naturally be split into
two classes, ordinal equilibria and their complement, cardinal equilibria. Ordinal equilibria, in
which by definition players condition only on how their signal ranks their actions and not the
strength of their signal, are remarkably robust and have a natural interpretation as routines.
They are ex post equilibria and therefore do not depend the distributions of signals, players’
beliefs about these distributions, or higher-order beliefs etc. They also are (fully) cursed—that
is consistent with players having a coarse perception of how other players’ information affects
their play (Eyster and Rabin [2005])—, and robust to natural specifications of overconfidence
by team members. In an ordinal equilibrium the only information a player needs to assess the
optimality of her own strategy is the pattern of behavior of other players, regardless of how that
behavior depends on other players’ information.
Given the multiplicity of ordinal equilibria, there is a role for managerial selection of routines.
If management knows the process that generates agents’ signals, it can choose an optimal routine,
which we characterize. Without this knowledge, it is still possible for management to select a
routine that given our robustness result will be an equilibrium and in this sense solves the
coordination problem. In an environment in which signal distributions are changing and it is
costly for management to determine exactly which distribution applies, it is possible for non-
optimal routines to survive that have been optimal at an earlier point in time.
Optimal ordinal equilibria (and thus optimal routines) generally are not optimal equilibria.
We show that optimal equilibria exist and that they have a simple intuitive structure that
1Coordination problems in health-care teams have been documented by Amy C. Edmondson [2004]. Specifically
she attributes the frequent lack of learning from failure to inadequate communication. She finds in her empirical
work that “process failures in hospitals have systemic causes, often originating in different groups or departments
from where the failure is experienced, and so learning from them requires cross departmental communication and
collaboration.”
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generalizes the concept of an equilibrium in cutoff strategies. Unlike ordinal equilibria, optimal
equilibria depend on the fine details of the game such as players’ knowledge of each others’ signal
distributions.
We identify organizational routines as patterns of behavior among multiple interacting agents
with distributed knowledge.2 Distributed knowledge is a characteristic of the environment we
study. Patterns of behavior are attributes of a class of equilibria in this environment: In an
ordinal equilibrium the members of the organization make only limited use of the private in-
formation that is available to them and conditional on a rank-ordering of their actions follow a
fixed predetermined schema of action choices.
One play according to an ordinal equilibrium is then to be thought of as one instantiation
of the routine. The recurrence that is widely held to characterize routines is captured by the
independence of ordinal equilibrium behavior from some of the details of the game; neither need
agents know the exact generating process for their private information, nor need they know what
other player believe this process to be. Thus the same behavior pattern remains an equilibrium
across an entire array of possible situations. We can think of routines in our setting either as the
result of learned behavior, e.g. if after each play of the game actions and payoffs become public,
or as the result of infrequent managerial intervention. According to the latter interpretation,
whenever the expected benefits of resetting a routine exceed the costs of information acquisition,
management collects data to identify the true signal generating process and prescribes a routine
that is optimal for that process. Routines in that case are the result of optimizing behavior
subject to deliberation and informational constraints, akin to standard operating procedures.
Since routines are not tailored to every specific situation they are characterized by subop-
timality, a point emphasized by Cohen and Bacdayan [1994] and shared by our model. In our
setting routines can at the same time be interpreted as equilibrium phenomena in interactions
between rational but constrained agents (as for example in Chassang [2010]). As we will see,
however, the routine behavior that we describe is robust to a variety of behavioral biases and
rationality constraints. Furthermore, since routines can maximize payoffs in our setting when
agents have behavioral biases, our results are consistent with the view that routines are optimal
organizational responses to the presence of boundedly rational agents.
In general, efforts to coordinate can be affected by a variety of constraints, including strate-
gic uncertainty, lack of precedent, conflicting incentives, absence of communication, imperfect
2Organizational routines have long been an object of study (e.g. Nelson and Winter [1982]) and continue to
attract attention as a unit of analysis of organizational behavior (e.g. Cohen and Bacdayan [1994]). Much of that
literature is reviewed in Becker [2004], who notes that the terminology surrounding routines is not entirely settled
but mentions patterned behavior and distributed knowledge as frequently being associated with routines.
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observability, and private information as well as behavioral biases of the team members such as
lack of strategic sophistication and mistakes in information processing. We principally focus on
the constraint that is imposed by players having private information about payoffs, while ruling
out communication and making actions unobservable. Incentives are perfectly aligned. There-
fore we have a team problem and can frame the coordination question as one of maximizing the
team’s joint payoff subject to its informational, observational, rationality, and communication
constraints.
The framing of coordination as a constrained maximization problem is reminiscent of the
approach taken by Crawford and Haller [1990]. They study the question of how to achieve
static coordination by way of repeated interaction in an environment where the constraint is
that players lack a common language for their actions and roles in a game. They model such
absence of a common language through requiring that players use symmetric strategies and treat
all actions symmetrically that have not been distinguished by past play. Coordination in their
setting is achieved via the common observation of precedents that are created by the history of
play and that help desymmetrize actions and player roles.
Coordinating as quickly as possible is also at the heart of Alpern’s [1976] telephone problem:
There is an equal number of telephones in two rooms. They are pairwise connected. In each
period a person in each room picks up the receiver on one of the phones. The goal is to identify
a working connection in minimum expected time. Unlike in Crawford and Haller’s work, in the
telephone problem there is uncertainty about which action combination leads to coordination
(i.e. a working connection). Hence players face a two-fold constraint. In addition to lacking a
common language that would permit them to implement an optimal search pattern from the
outset, they also cannot use observations of past actions to create precedents for search patterns.
Blume and Franco [2007] study dynamic coordination in a search-for-success game in which
players have an identical number of actions, some fraction of action profiles are successes and,
as in the telephone problem, players cannot observe each others’ actions. They permit any
finite number of players, any fixed number of success profiles, let every positioning of success
profiles be equally likely and have players maximize present discounted values. They show that
in an optimal strategy that respects the symmetry constraints of Crawford and Haller, players
will revisit action profiles by chance, and that this may occur even before all possibilities of
guaranteeing the visit of a novel profile has been exhausted. Blume, Duffy and Franco [2009]
find experimental evidence for such behavior in a simple version of the search-for-success game.
In contrast to this literature, where symmetry is the principal constraint, in the present set-
ting coordination on an optimal search pattern is difficult because the problem-solving knowledge
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is distributed throughout the organization: Each player knows privately for each of his actions
how likely it is that this action is required for a coordinated solution. Implementing the ex-post
optimal search pattern, however, requires knowing every team members’ private information.
Communication constraints in an organizational setting with private information and com-
mon interests have recently been studied by Ellison and Holden [2010]. ...
More distantly related is the Condorcet-jury-theorem literature (e.g. Austen-Smith and
Banks [1996] and McLennan [1998]), which studies how players aggregate decentralized knowl-
edge via voting in a common interest game and shares the assumption that players cannot
directly communicate their private signals.
To summarize our results, we find that routines partially solve the team coordination prob-
lem. They synchronize the team’s search efforts and help avoid repetition inefficiencies where
the same action profile is tried more than once. They are resilient to changes in the environment
(signal distributions, agents’ beliefs about these distributions, beliefs about these beliefs etc.)
and therefore can serve as focal points across a range of search problems. Routines are fully
cursed equilibria and, thus, robust to a lack of full strategic sophistication by team members.
Furthermore, routines are robust to various forms of information-processing mistakes—such as
overconfidence in the ability to predict ones correct action—of the team members. This resilience
of routines, however, comes with a two-fold cost: First, routines may become outdated; a routine
that was optimal (among routines) for a given set of conditions may not fit current conditions.
Second, even optimal routines are generally not optimal problem solving strategies for the team;
under a wide range of conditions the team would be better off to give more discretion to its
members by letting their behavior be more sensitive to the quality of their information. We
also, however, highlight through a simple example that the latter conclusion depends on the
team members being fully rational: in the presence of information-processing mistakes such as
overconfidence by team members, routines can be strictly optimal.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we describe the model. In Section
3 we illustrate our setup and results with a completely worked out example; in Section 4 we
characterize the set of ordinal equilibria and discuss the properties of these routines; in Section
5 we prove existence of optimal equilibria and give conditions under which optimal equilibria
are not ordinal; and in Section 6 we offer some conclusions and suggestions for future work.
2 The Model
Our model is a formal representation of the following stylized “safe problem”: A group of
individuals wants to open a safe. Each of them has access to a separate dial in an isolated room.
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There is a single combination of dial settings that will open the safe. The group repeatedly
tries out different combinations. It is impossible to communicate or to observe the actions of
other group members. Initially, each individual privately and independently receives a signal
that indicates for each of her dial settings the probability of it being correct, i.e. being part of
the combination that will open the safe. The probability that any given combination is correct
is the product of the corresponding signals.
Formally, each player i out of a finite number I of players has a finite set of actions Ai that
has cardinality mi; we will slightly abuse notation by using I to denote both the set of players
and its cardinality. A := ×Ii=1Ai denotes the set of action profiles. A typical element of Ai is
denoted ai and we write a = (ai, a−i) ∈ A for a typical action profile. There is a single success
profile a∗ ∈ A with a common positive payoff u(a∗) = 1, and the common payoff from any
profile a 6= a∗ equals u(a) = 0. The location of the success profile a∗ is randomly chosen from
a distribution ω ∈ Ω := ∆(A) over the set of all action profiles. The distribution ω itself is
randomly drawn from a distribution F ∈ ∆(∆(A)), the set of distributions over distributions of
success profiles. This permits us to express the idea that players are not only uncertain about
the location of the success profile, but also that each player has some information regarding
the location that is unknown to others. Formally, after ω is chosen, each player i learns ωi, the
marginal distribution over player i’s actions. Thus, if ω(a) denotes the probability that ω assigns
to the profile a being the success profile, ωi(aij) =
∑
j1,...,ji−1,ji+1,...,jn
ω(a1j1 , . . . aij . . . anjn) is
the probability that a success requires player i to take action aij . Denote the set of player i’s
marginal distributions ωi by Ωi.
We make two assumptions that limit how much players can infer about the signals of others
from their own signals. We assume action independence, which requires that each ω in the
support of F be the product of its marginals, i.e. ω = ΠIi=1ωi. Furthermore, we require signal
independence, which requires that F is the product of its marginals, Fi, i.e. F (ω) = Π
I
i=1Fi(ωi).
3
Upon observing her signal a player therefore does not revise her belief about how confident other
players are about which of their actions are required for a success profile.
Players choose actions in each of T < ∞ periods, unless they find the success profile, at
which point the game ends immediately. Players do not observe the actions of other players.
Therefore a player’s strategy conditions only on the history of her own actions. Denote the
action taken by player i in period t by ati. Then player i’s action history at the beginning of
period t is hit := (a
0, a1i , . . . , a
t−1
i ), where a
0 is an auxiliary action that initializes the game. We
let ht = (h1t, . . . , hIt) denote the period-t action history of all players. The set of all period-t
3We discuss possible consequences of violations of these assumptions in the Appendix.
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action histories of player i is denoted Hit, where we adopt the convention that Hi1 = {a
0}.
The set of period-t action histories of all players is Ht and the set of all action histories of
all players is H := ∪Tt=1Ht. A (pure) strategy of player i is a function si : Hit × Ωi → Ai
and we use s to denote a profile of pure strategies. For any pure strategy profile s and signal
vector ω, let at(s, ω) denote the profile of actions that is induced in period t. Similarly, define
At(s, ω) := {a ∈ A|aτ (s, ω) = a for some τ ≤ t} as the set of all profiles that the strategy s
induces before period t+ 1 when the signal realization is ω. A behaviorally mixed strategies σi
for player i is a (measurable) function σi : Hit × Ωi → ∆(Ai). We use Σ
T
i to refer to the set of
such strategies in the T -period game. ΣT := ×i∈IΣ
T
i is the set of mixed strategy profiles in the
T -period game. Players discount future payoffs with a common factor δ ∈ (0, 1). Thus, if t∗ is
the first period in which the success profile a∗ is played, the common payoff equals δt
∗−1; if the
success profile is never played the common payoff is zero.
We will now formally describe payoffs. For that purpose define {a 6∈ ht} as the event that
action profile a has not occurred in history ht. Furthermore let the probability of reaching the
initial history Prob(h1|σ, ω, a) = 1 and for t > 1, with ht = (ht−1, a
′) denoting the action history
ht−1 followed by the action profile a
′, recursively define the probability of reaching history ht
given σ, ω and given that a is the success profile through
Prob(ht|σ, ω, a) := 1{a 6∈ht−1}
∏
i∈I
σi(a
′
i|hi,t−1, ωi)Prob(ht−1|σ, ω, a).
Then expected payoffs from strategy profile σ are given by∫
ω∈Ω
∑
a∈A
∑
ht∈H
δt−1
∏
i∈I
σi(ai|hi,t, ωi)Prob(ht|σ, ω, a)ω(a)dF (ω),
where
∏
i∈I σi(ai|hi,t, ωi)Prob(ht|σ, ω, a) denotes the (unconditional) probability that action pro-
file a is played following history ht and ω(a) is the probability that a is the success profile. We will
denote the expected payoff from strategy profile σ by π(σ) and player i’s expected payoff from
strategy profile σ conditional on having observed signal ωi by πi(σ;ωi). Observe that expected
payoffs are well-defined since ∆(A) is a finite-dimensional unit simplex, and F is a distribution
over this simplex. For simplicity, we assume throughout the paper that F has full support on
∆(A). The timing of the game is as follows: (1) Nature draws a distribution ω ∈ ∆(A) from the
distribution F. (2) Each player receives a signal ωi. (3) The success profile is drawn from the
realized distribution ω. (4) Players start choosing actions.
One of our objectives in this paper is to demonstrate that routines are often suboptimal,
and hence we compare them to optimal strategies. Regarding optimal strategies, some facts are
worth noting. First, since we are studying common interest games, i.e. the payoff functions of the
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players coincide, there is a simple relation between optimality and (Bayesian Nash) equilibrium.
An optimal strategy profile must be a Nash equilibrium since all players have a common payoff
and if there were a profitable deviation for one player, then a higher common payoff would
be achievable, contradicting optimality.4 Second, as long as an optimal strategy profile exists,
this observation has the following useful corollary: any equilibrium that is payoff-dominated by
some strategy is also payoff-dominated by an equilibrium strategy. We use this fact repeatedly
throughout.
The third noteworthy fact is that optimality implies sequential rationality in common interest
games. Specifically, any optimal outcome of a common interest game can be supported by a
strategy profile σ that is an essentially perfect Bayesian equilibrium (EPBE) (see Blume and
Heidhues [2006] for a the formal definition and detailed discussion of EPBE)5, i.e. one can
partition the set of all histories into relevant and irrelevant histories so that σ is optimal after
all relevant histories regardless of play after irrelevant histories. In general games it is frequently
the case that Nash equilibria are supported by specific behavior off the path of play, which may
not be sequentially rational. In an optimal strategy profile of a common-interest game, however,
following the prescribed behavior on the path of play is optimal independent of what players do
off the path of play. This can be seen as follows. Classify any history off the path of play of an
optimal profile σ as irrelevant and any other history as relevant. Now suppose that there is a
partial profile σˆ−i that agrees with σ−i on the path of play and a deviation σ
′
i of player i from σi
that is profitable against σˆ−i. Then, since we have a common interest game, the strategy profile
(σ′i, σˆ−i) yields a higher payoff for all players than σ, which contradicts optimality of σ.
Below, after formally introducing and characterizing them, we also show that routines are
sequentially rational by proving that any ordinal equilibrium outcome in our setting can be
supported by an EPBE.
3 Example: Two Players, Two Actions, Two Periods, and Uni-
form Signal Distributions
In this section we present a 2 × 2 × 2-uniform-example, i.e. with two players, two actions per
player, two choice periods, and uniform signal distributions. This example serves to develop
intuition for finding and comparing equilibria that carries over to more general games with an
4This is also used in Alpern [2002], Crawford and Haller [1990], and McLennan [1998].
5In finite games the outcomes that are supported by perfect Bayesian equilibria coincide with those supported
by EPBEa. The use of EPBE, however, allows one to focus on the economically relevant aspects of the sequential
rationally requirement because it does not require one to specify behavior after irrelevant histories, which although
economically irrelevant can be technically challenging. Furthermore, if following irrelevant histories continuation
equilibria do not exist in infinite games, EPBE is a superior solution concept.
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arbitrary (finite) number of players and actions per player, and with an arbitrary time horizon.
In the example one can identify classes of equilibria, characterize optimal behavior, and illustrate
the difficulties arising in joint search more generally. We highlight that there are multiple Pareto-
ranked equilibria and that in the search for optimal equilibria it suffices to investigate convex-
partition equilibria in which a player’s signal space is partitioned into convex subsets over which
the player chooses the same action sequence. Furthermore, systematic equilibria that could serve
as routines and in which there is no repetition inefficiency exist but are suboptimal; the optimal
equilibrium exhibits both repetition inefficiency, i.e. with positive probability players repeatedly
try the same action profile, and search-order inefficiency, where less promising profiles are tried
before more promising ones. In contrast to the optimal equilibrium, however, routines are robust
to strategic naivete—they are cursed equilibria—and overconfidence in the sense that the payoff
achieved when using these routines remains constant when introducing various degrees of the
above biases, while the payoff of attempting to play the optimal strategy profile decrease in
the presence of these biases. We also show that a manager who is aware that her agents are
sufficiently overconfident, strictly prefers a routine to a more flexible (cardinal) problem-solving
approach in this example.
Player i has the action set Ai = {ai1, ai2} and receives a signal vector ωi = (ωi1, ωi2).
The signal component ωij is the probability that a success requires action aij by player i. Our
assumption of action independence implies that conditional on the signals ω1 = (ω11, ω12) and
ω2 = (ω21, ω22) the probability that the success profile is (a1j , a2k) equals ω1j · ω2k. Since
ωi2 = 1 − ωi1, the signal ωi can be identified with ωi1. We assume that the distribution Fi of
signals ωi1 is uniform on the the interval [0, 1]. Therefore our assumption of signal independence
implies that the probability that ω11 < x and ω21 < y equals x·y for all x and y with 0 ≤ x, y ≤ 1.
In this section—in order to simplify notation—denote the higher of player one’s two signals
(the first order statistic of his signals) by α, i.e. α := max{ω11, ω12}. Similarly, for player two,
define β := max{ω21, ω22}. α and β are the first order statistics of the uniform distribution
on the one-dimensional unit simplex. Note that α and β are independently and uniformly
distributed on the interval [12 , 1]. In the sequel, when talking about player one’s action, it will be
often convenient to refer to his α (or high-probability) action and his 1−α (or low-probability)
action, and similarly for player two.
It is immediately clear that the full-information solution (or ex post-efficient search), which
a social planner with access to both players’ private information would implement, is not an
equilibrium in the game with private information. The social planner would prescribe the α-
action to player one and the β-action to player two in the first period, and in the second period
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would prescribe the profile (α, (1 − β)) if α(1 − β) > (1 − α)β, and the profile ((1 − α), β)
otherwise. The players themselves, who only have access to their own information, are unable
to carry out these calculations and cannot decide which of the two players should switch actions
and who should stick to her first-period action. This raises a number of questions: What is the
constrained planner’s optimum, i.e. which strategy profile would a planner prescribe who does
not have access to the players’ private information? What are the equilibria of the game?
Two simple strategy profiles are easily seen to be equilibria. In one, player one takes his α
action in both periods and player two takes his β action in the first and his 1− β action in the
second period. In the second equilibrium, player two stays with his β action throughout and
player one switches. In these equilibria, players condition only on the rank order of their actions
according to their signal (which action is the α action) and not on signal strength (the specific
value of α). They never examine the same cell twice. These equilibria are ex post equilibria;
i.e., each player i’s behavior remains optimal even after learning the other player j’s signal. As
long as we maintain action independence, these strategy profiles remain equilibria regardless
of each player’s signal distributions. In addition these equilibria are fully cursed: The non-
switching player need not know that the other player switches from a high- to a low probability
action. All she needs to know is that the other player switches. Similarly, all the switching
player needs to know is that the other player does not switch. She need not know that the
non-switching player sticks to her high-probability action. Thus, these equilibria are robust to
changes in the environment and to player ignorance about the details of how the other player’s
private information affects behavior. If we imagine players facing similar problems (perhaps
with varying Fi) repeatedly over time, this robustness makes these equilibria natural candidates
for being adopted as routines: One player is designated (perhaps by management) to always
stay put and the other to always switch regardless of the new problem.
While these “routine equilibria” are robust and avoid repetitions, they make only the first-
period decision sensitive to the players’ information; the switching decision does not depend on
the signal. One may wonder whether it would not be better to tie the switching probability
to the signal as well. Intuitively, a player with a strong signal, α close to one, should be less
inclined to switch than a player with a weak signal, α close to one half. In order to investigate
the existence of equilibria in which signal strength matters in addition to the ranking of actions,
we need to describe players’ strategies more formally.
A strategy for player i has three components: (1) pi1(ωi1), the probability of taking action
ai1 in period 1 as a function of the signal; (2) q
i
1(ωi1), the probability of taking action ai1 in
period 2 after having taken action ai1 in period 1 as a function of the signal; and (3), q
i
2(ωi1), the
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probability of taking action ai1 in period 2 after having taken action ai2 in period 1 as a function
of the signal. We show in the appendix, using the fact that actions are unobservable, that for any
behaviorally mixed strategy that conditions on player i’s signal ωi1 there is a payoff equivalent
strategy that conditions only on his signal strength α and vice versa. Intuitively, because player
j does not observe which action i chooses, i’s payoff depends only on the associated signal
strength and not the name of the chosen action. More precisely, consider two different signals
ω′i1 and ω
′′
i1 that give rise to the same α. Hence, these signals differ only in that one identifies
action 1 and the other action 2 as the high-probability action (H). Without loss of generality,
suppose that ω′i1 identifies action 1 as the high-probability action so that α = ω
′
i1 = 1 − ω
′′
i1.
Define pi(α) ≡ (1/2) pi1(ω
′
i1) + (1/2) (1 − p
i
1(ω
′′
i1)), which is the probability of taking the high-
probability action in period 1 as a function of the signal strength α. Defining qih(α) and q
i
l(α)
similarly (again the intuitive obvious but tedious formal argument is in the Appendix), we can
thus express player i’s strategy using the following reduced-form probabilities: (1) pi(α), the
probability of taking the high-probability action in period 1 as a function of the signal; (2)
qih(α), the probability of taking the high-probability action in period 2 after having taken the
high-probability action in period 1 as a function of the signal; and (3), qil(α), the probability of
taking the high-probability action in period 2 after having taken the low-probability action in
period 1 as a function of the signal.
We will also make use of the fact (verified in the Appendix for the general setup) that in our
game Nash equilibria can be studied in terms of mappings from players’ signals to distributions
over sequences of actions. Intuitively, since j’s first-period choice is unobservable, player i cannot
condition on player j’s past behavior. Hence, we can think of i as choosing the entire action
sequence upon observing his signal ωi.
Now fix a strategy for player 2. We are interested in the payoff of player one for anyone of
his possible signal-strength types α, for any possible action sequence he may adopt, and for any
possible strategy of player two. In writing down payoffs, we will use the fact that in equilibrium
player two will never stick to his low-probability action in the second period after having used
his low-probability action in the first period, i.e. q2l (β) = 1 for all β ∈ [
1
2 , 1] in every equilibrium.
Then type α of player 1 has the following payoff from taking the high-probability action in both
periods:
HH(α) =
∫ 1
1
2
2
[
αβ + α(1− β)δ(1− q2h(β))
]
p2(β)dβ(1)
+
∫ 1
1
2
2 [αβδ + α(1− β)] (1− p2(β))dβ
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Player 1’s payoff from taking the high-probability action in the first and the low-probability
action in the second period, when his type is α, equals
HL(α) =
∫ 1
1
2
2
[
αβ + (1− α)βδq2h(β) + (1− α)(1− β)δ(1− q
2
h(β))
]
p2(β)dβ(2)
+
∫ 1
1
2
2 [α(1− β) + (1− α)βδ] (1− p2(β))dβ
Player 1’s payoff from taking the low-probability action in the first and the high-probability
action in the second period, when his type is α, equals
LH(α) =
∫ 1
1
2
2
[
αβδq2h(β) + α(1− β)δ(1− q
2
h(β)) + (1− α)β
]
p2(β)dβ(3)
+
∫ 1
1
2
2 [αβδ + (1− α)(1− β)] (1− p2(β))dβ
The sequence of actions LL is strictly dominated for all α > 12 .
It follows by inspection that all three of these payoffs are linear in α and that HH(·) is strictly
increasing in α. Intuitively, the better the signal the higher the payoff from choosing the more
promising action in both periods. Also, when being sure that a particular action is correct,
it is always (weakly) better to select this action independent of how ones partner behaves, i.e.
HH(1) ≥ HL(1) and HH(1) > LH(1). At the other extreme, when both actions are equally likely
to be correct the first-period choice does not matter (i.e. HL
(
1
2
)
= LH
(
1
2
)
) and switching to
ensure that a new cell is investigated in the second period is weakly dominant HL
(
1
2
)
≥ HH(12).
These properties are illustrated in Figure 1.
Note also that HL
(
1
2
)
= HH
(
1
2
)
is only possible if Player 2 switches with probability zero,
i.e. if q2h(β) = 0 for almost all β. In that case, since the sequence LL is played with probability
zero in equilibrium, player two must either play HL or LH with probability one. But if player two
switches with probability one, HH is the unique best reply (up to changes on a set of measure
11
zero), which in turn requires that player two plays HL with probability one.
α12 1c1
··
··
··
··
··
··
··
··
··
··
··
·
-
6










HH(α)







HL(α)
((((
((((
((((
((((
((((
LH(α)
··
··
··
··
··
··
··
··
··
··
··
··
··
··
··
··
··
··
··
··
··
··
··
··
··
α12 1c1
··
··
··
··
··
··
··
··
··
··
··
··
··
··
··
-
6










HH(α)







HL(α)










LH(α)
··
··
··
··
··
··
··
··
··
··
··
··
··
··
··
··
··
··
··
··
··
··
··
··
··
Figure 1
We begin by considering equilibria in which HL(1) 6= LH(1), as depicted in Figure 1. This
implies that in equilibrium player 1 (similarly for player 2) either plays HH for all α, or HL for
all α, or LH for all α, or there exists a critical value c1 such that he plays HL for α ≤ c1 and
HH for α > c1, or there exists a critical value c1 such that he plays LH for α ≤ c1 and HH for
α > c1. In addition, against a player using only the action sequences HH and HL, the action
sequence LH is never optimal, because in that case HL is a better response. This leaves only
two possible types of equilibria for which HL(1) 6= LH(1):
1. HL-equilibria in which player i has a cutoff ci such that he uses HL for α below this cutoff
(and HH above the cutoff), and
2. LH-equilibria in which player i has a cutoff ci such that he uses LH for α below this cutoff
(and HH above the cutoff).
Figure 1 illustrates the payoff structure for different action sequences as they would look in
these two types of equilibria for interior cutoffs, i.e. ci ∈ (0, 1). The left panel illustrates an
HL-equilibrium and the right panel an LH-equilibrium.
Because a player i with a cutoff signal ci must be indifferent between playing HH and HL,
cutoffs in any HL-equilibrium must satisfy the system of equations:
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∫ 1
c3−i
ciβdβ +
∫ c3−i
1
2
[ciβ + ci(1− β)δ] dβ(4)
=
∫ 1
c3−i
[ciβ + (1− ci)βδ] dβ +
∫ c3−i
1
2
[ciβ + (1− ci)(1− β)δ] dβ i = 1, 2.
Conversely, because LH is never an optimal response to the other player playing only HL and
HH, any solution to this system of equations corresponds to an HL-equilibrium. There are
exactly three solutions in the relevant range of ci ∈ [
1
2 , 1] i = 1, 2. These are, (c1, c2) = (.5, 1),
(c1, c2) = (1, .5), and (c1, c2) ≈ (0.760935, 0.760935). The cutoffs (c1, c2) = (.5, 1) and (c1, c2) =
(1, .5) correspond to the two systematic-search equilibria discussed above.
A necessary condition for having an LH-equilibrium is that players do not have an incentive
to deviate to HL for any α. Given the linearity of the payoff functions, this condition is satisfied
if at each player i’s cutoff ci we have HH(ci) = LH(ci) ≥ HL(ci). As a result we have an
LH-equilibrium if the following conditions are satisfied:
∫ 1
c3−i
ciβdβ +
∫ c3−i
1
2
[ciβδ + ci(1− β)] dβ(5)
=
∫ 1
c3−i
[ciβδ + (1− ci)β] dβ +
∫ c3−i
1
2
[ciβδ + (1− ci)(1− β)] dβ i = 1, 2.
and
(6)
∫ c3−i
1
2
ciβdβ ≥
∫ 1
1
2
(1− ci)βdβ i = 1, 2.
The solutions of the system of equations (5) in the relevant range of ci ∈ [
1
2 , 1] i = 1, 2, depend
on δ. For δ = 1, there are three solutions: (c1, c2) = (.5, 1), (c1, c2) = (1, .5), and a symmetric
solution. We establish in the appendix that for δ < 1 there is a unique solution to equation (5),
which is symmetric (c1 = c2 = c) and increasing in the discount factor δ. This unique solution
is an equilibrium provided that it satisfies condition (6), which is equivalent to
4c3 + 2c− 3 ≥ 0.
The smallest value, c∗, of c that satisfies the above inequality is c∗ ≈ 0.728082. The corre-
sponding discount factor for which c∗ is a symmetric solution to the system of equations (5)
is δ∗ ≈ 0.861276. Hence for δ ∈ (δ∗, 1) there exists a unique solution with a common cutoff
c(δ) that is strictly increasing in the discount factor δ. Intuitively, if players are very impatient,
i.e. δ = 0, then independent of the other player’s behavior, each player wants to maximize the
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probability of a success in the first period and will therefore initially choose his high- probability
action. Thus an LH-equilibrium does not exist when players are highly impatient. When players
are very patient, on the other hand, their primary concern is with finding a success in either
period. In that case, against a player who only uses HH and LH, playing LH may be attractive
because it ensures both that two different action profiles are examined and it takes advantage
of a complementarity between action sequences that switch in the same order.6
The next proposition summarizes our discussion thus far:
Proposition 1 The entire set of equilibria in which neither player is indifferent between HL and
LH for all signal realizations has the following form: For all δ ∈ (0, 1), there exists a symmetric
HL-equilibrium with common cutoff c ≈ 0.760935 and there exist two asymmetric HL-equilibria
with cutoffs (c1, c2) = (.5, 1) and (c1, c2) = (1, .5), respectively. Furthermore, there is a critical
discount factor δ∗ ≈ 0.861276 such that for all δ ∈ (δ∗, 1) there exists a symmetric LH-equilibrium
with common cutoff c(δ), which is strictly increasing in δ, where c(δ∗) ≈ 0.728082. Conversely,
no LH-equilibrium exists for δ < δ∗.
Proposition 1 completely characterizes the set of equilibria that satisfy the condition HL(1) 6=
LH(1) for both players. Under some conditions, there also exist equilibria with HL(1) = LH(1)
for at least one player. (We construct such equilibria in the Appendix.) Since in these equilibria
one or both of the players are indifferent between HL and LH over a range of signal strengths
that has positive probability, we call these IN-equilibria. In an IN-equilibrium at least one of the
players either randomizes between LH and HL over some range of signal strengths or one can
partition a subset of the set of possible signal strengths into sets where he either plays LH or HL.
In either case, IN-equilibria can be ignored in the search for optimal strategy profiles. Players
would be better off if both players switched to playing HL over the relevant range: If a single
player switches payoffs are not affected because of indifference; if then the other player switches
as well payoffs strictly increase because HL is strictly better than LH against HL. To find the
optimal equilibrium, we thus only have to compare the payoffs from the equilibria characterized
in Proposition 1. For each player, all of these equilibria are simple in the sense that they assign
a particular action sequence to a convex subset of his signal space (here the unit interval).7
6Given (almost) any realization of signal strengths α and β, for δ = 1 conditional on both players switching,
they receive higher payoffs if they switch in the same order. This can be seen as follows: For δ = 1, the difference in
payoffs between switching in the same order and in opposite orders equals [αβ−(1−α)(1−β)]−[(1−α)β−α(1−β)] =
1− 2α(1− β)− 2β(1− α). The derivative of the right-hand side (RHS) of the equation with respect to β equals
2α − 2 and therefore is negative for almost all α and if we evaluate RHS at the lowest possible value of β, i.e.
β = 1
2
, then RHS equals 1 − α − (1 − α) = 0. Hence, for almost all values of α and β the RHS, and thus the
payoff difference between switching in the same and in opposite orders, is positive.
7Below we will illustrate that this feature of optimal equilibria generalizes to other distributions and an
arbitrary number of players and periods.
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Furthermore, when considering the equilibria of Proposition 1, we can immediately rule out
that an LH-equilibrium is optimal: To see this, simply change both players’ strategies to HL-
strategies, without changing the cutoff. Under the original strategies, there are three possible
events, each arising with strictly positive probability: Both players follow an HH-sequence; both
follow an LH sequence; and, one follows an LH-sequence while the other follows an HH sequence.
Clearly LH is not optimal against HH and therefore in this instance the new strategy yields a
strict improvement. Also, both players following HL rather than LH yields a strict improvement
for impatient players. Thus in two events there is a strict payoff improvement, in the remaining
event payoffs are unaffected, and all three events have strictly positive probability.
It is, however, not immediately clear whether to prefer the symmetric HL-equilibrium or
the asymmetric HL-equilibria. In either, there is positive probability that profiles are searched
in the wrong order. The symmetric equilibrium makes the second-period switching probability
sensitive to a player’s signal, which seems sensible. At the same time, it introduces an additional
possible source of inefficiency. Players may not succeed in the first round despite having signals
so strong that they do not switch in the second round. In that case, they inefficiently search
only one of the available profiles.
It would be a straightforward matter to calculate and compare payoffs from symmetric
and asymmetric equilibria directly. We will follow a different route in order to introduce
some methodological ideas that prove useful more generally. Start with the asymmetric HL-
equilibrium in which c1 =
1
2 and c2 = 1. Consider the (informationally-constrained) social
planner who raises c1 from
1
2 and lowers c2 from 1 by the same amount γ. His second-period
payoff (note that the first-period payoff is not affected by γ) as a function of γ is proportional
to
π(γ) =
∫ 1−γ
1
2
∫ 1
2
+γ
1
2
(1− α)(1− β)dαdβ +
∫ 1
1−γ
∫ 1
2
+γ
1
2
(1− α)βdαdβ +
∫ 1−γ
1
2
∫ 1
1
2
+γ
α(1− β)dαdβ.
It is straightforward to check that ∂π(γ)∂γ
∣∣∣
γ=0
= 0 and ∂
2π(γ)
∂γ2
∣∣∣
γ=0
> 0. Hence, the social planer
can improve on the two asymmetric equilibria. Recall that for any arbitrary strategy profile σ,
either σ is an equilibrium or there exists an equilibrium σ∗ with ui(σ
∗) > ui(σ) for i = 1, 2. Thus
the pair of cutoff strategy profiles with cutoffs c1 = 1/2+γ and c2 = 1−γ with an appropriately
small value of γ either is an equilibrium or there exists an equilibrium that strictly dominates it.
Furthermore, an optimal strategy profile must be one of the partition-equilibria characterized
in Proposition 1. Therefore, we have the following observation:
Proposition 2 For any δ ∈ (0, 1), in the two-player two-action two-period game with signals
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that are independently and uniformly distributed, the symmetric HL-equilibrium is the optimal
equilibrium and at the same time the optimal strategy that an informationally-constrained social
planner would implement.
The example nicely illustrates that routines are suboptimal with fully rational players. This
raises the question why players would select such a Pareto-dominated equilibrium. Furthermore,
in the example there is no given routine that stands out, which raises the question of how
players would select a particular routine. We informally think of routines as being selected by
the management of the organization, which makes recommendation to the players of how to
behave. This raises the question under what circumstance management would want to select
a problem-solving routine. The following example highlights that routines can be optimal if
agents are not fully rational. We begin by arguing that routines can be optimal when agents
are overconfident.
Suppose that a player interprets her signal as having a first-order statistic of (1 − x)α + x,
where x ∈ (0, 1). In this stylized example, x is a measure of a player’s overconfidence. As
x approaches 1, a player always believes with (almost certainty) to know what her correct
action is while the true probability is still uniformly distributed. For the sake of the example,
suppose both players are equally overconfident (have the same x) and consider the payoff of
a symmetric HL-type equilibrium in which players are meant to play HH when very confident
and HL otherwise. In particular, we suppose that an overconfident player correctly predicts
for what signals her fellow team member switches and consider the true signal at which she
is indifferent between switching and not switching. That is for any given true cutoff signal
c3−i of her fellow team member, a player with a perceived signal c˜i ≡ (1 − x)ci + x must be
indifferent between switching and not switching. Now replacing ci with the perceived signal
(1−x)ci+x in Equation 4, shows that if player i becomes extremely overconfident(x→ 1), then
her true cutoff signal approaches (1/2) for any c3−i > 1/2. This implies that in the symmetric
equilibrium as both players become extremely overconfident (x→ 1), the true equilibrium cutoff
signal approaches 1/2.8 Intuitively, as long as there is a small probability of the other player
switching, an extremely overconfident player will be to reluctant to switch herself, and as her
overconfidence gets extreme (x approaches 1) she will almost never do so.
Clearly, however, as the common cutoff c→ 1/2 the players’ payoff is less than in a routine.
Observe also that routines remain equilibria when players are overconfident. Even if Player
8Formally, take any sequence of equilibrium cutoffs c(x) as x → 1. This sequence must have a convergent
subsequence. Suppose the convergent subsequence converges to some cutoff cˆ > 1/2. Then for any ǫ > 0, there
exists an x¯ such that for all x > x¯, c(x) ∈ (cˆ− ǫ, c+ ǫ). This however contradicts the above established fact that
for any c > 1/2, the cutoff signal her team member responds with goes to 1/2.
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i is extremely confident that she knows what action is correct, if Player j never switches it is
optimal to switch for Player i. Hence, in our example, when players are sufficiently overconfident
it becomes strictly optimal for the management to implement a routine, and the payoffs of the
routine are fully robust to players’ overconfidence. We emphasize this fact in
Proposition 3 For any δ ∈ (0, 1), in the two-player two-action two-period game with signals
that are independently and uniformly distributed, if players are sufficiently overconfident, then
the payoff of an ordinal equilibrium is higher than that of the overconfident symmetric HL-
equilibrium.
Routines are also robust to other types of biases documented and modeled in behavioral
economics. For example, suppose agents are strategically naive in the sense that they play cursed
equilibria. In a fully cursed equilibrium, each player best responds to the actual distribution
of actions sequences by the other player but fails to take into account how this distribution of
action sequences depends on the other player’s type. In an ordinal equilibrium, one player—say
1—always switches. It is then clearly optimal for player 2 to always select his high probability
action even if not realizing that player 1 switches from his high to his low-probability action.
Similarly, given that player 2 does not switch, it is clearly optimal for player 1 to do so. Hence
routines are fully cursed equilibria, and in this sense robust to strategic naivete of team members.
Cardinal equilibria, however, are not robust to such strategic naivete.
To see this, consider a symmetric fully-cursed equilibrium in which agents play HH when
having high signals and HL when having a low signal. In such a symmetric fully cursed equi-
librium with cutoff first-order statistic c, player 2 switches with probability 2(c− (1/2)). Given
this behavior, a fully cursed Player 1 is indifferent between switching and not switching when
having a first-order statistic α if
(7) α
[∫ 1
0
xdx
]
+ δα2
(
c−
1
2
)[∫ 1
0
xdx
]
= α
[∫ 1
0
xdx
]
+ δ(1− α)
[∫ 1
0
xdx
]
.
Furthermore, using that in a symmetric equilibrium α = c, the fully cursed equilibrium cutoff
satisfies: 2c2 − 1 = 0, so that the common cursed cutoff is equal to
√
1/2. Now calculating
the true payoff when players use the above cutoff for δ = 1 shows that the expected payoff is
0.753 while the payoff of the ordinal equilibria is 0.75. In our example, thus, lack of strategic
sophistication severely reduces the benefits of optimal equilibria over routines—although in
this specific case not completely eliminating it. It is natural to also consider teams in which
members exhibit some combination of cursedness and overconfidence, or are unsure about either
the cursedness or overconfidence of fellow team members. We highlight in the next section that
routines are fully robust to relaxing the rationality constraint simultaneously in these directions.
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4 Routines
In this section we identify and characterize a class of equilibria that have a natural interpretation
as organizational routines. In these ordinal equilibria players use strategies that condition only
on the rank order of signals not their value, which implies that independent of the concrete
signal realization team members always switch actions in a pre-specified order, thereby inducing
the common pattern of behavior that we interpret as a particular problem-solving routine.
a1,1
a1,2
a2,1 a2,2 a2,3
1 2 3
4 5 6
Figure 1
For an informal introduction of these routines consider, for example, the matrix of action
profiles in the stage game in Figure 1. In the figure ai,j denotes the j-th action of player i,
wlog ranked in the order of the corresponding signals, i.e. if we denote by αi,j the probability
that the j-th action of Player i is part of a success profile, then αi,j ≥ αi,j+1 for all i and j. For
convenience, the six action profiles have been numbered. Then there is an ordinal equilibrium
in which the profile labeled t is played in period t = 1, ..., 6. In this equilibrium, Player 1 plays
her most probable action in the first three periods during which Player 2 begins with his most
likely action, then tries the next most likely action, and finally attempts his least likely action.
Thereafter Player 1 switches to her least likely action and Player 2 repeats the previous sequence
of actions. Taking the action sequence of the other player as given, in each period both players
select the action that is most likely to lead to a success. On the other hand, there is no ordinal
equilibrium in which players play the sequence of profiles 1, 3, 2, 4, 5, 6: given that Player 1 is
playing her most probable action in the first three periods, Player 2 can deviate from such a
candidate equilibrium and in the first three periods select his action in the order of likelihood
of leading to a success, thereby inducing the profile 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, which yields a higher payoff.
This discussion suggest that a defining characteristic of ordinal equilibria is that each player in
every period selects an the action that is most likely to lead to a success. Propositions 4 and 5
below indeed show that all ordinal equilibria are characterized by players selecting such maximal
actions—which are precisely defined below—in every period. This, however, gives rise to a rich
class of equilibria including some counterintuitive incomplete search equilibria that nevertheless
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satisfy (the spirit of) trembling-hand perfection as we illustrate below. Proposition 6 establishes
that the entire class of ordinal equilibria is sequentially rational, and Proposition 7 specifies
the optimal ordinal equilibrium or optimal routine. Thereafter we discuss a variety of desirable
robustness properties of these routines.
We now turn to formally introducing routines. For tie-breaking purposes, it is convenient to
introduce a provisional ranking of player i’s actions, where all provisional rankings have equal
probability and player i learns the provisional ranking at the same time as he learns ωi. Using
this provisional ranking to break ties where necessary, for any signal ωi, we can generate a vector
r(ωi) that ranks each of player i’s actions aij , from the highest to the lowest probability of that
action being required for a success. Then a strategy σi of player i is ordinal if there exists a
function σ˜i such that σi(hit, ωi) = σ˜i(hit, r(ωi)) for all hit ∈ Hit and all ωi ∈ Ωi. A profile σ is
ordinal if it is composed of ordinal strategies; otherwise, it is cardinal.
For any action history ht define A(ht) := {a ∈ A|a ∈ ht} as the set of all action profiles that
have occurred before time t in history ht. Given a strategy profile σ and any private history
(ωi, hit) that is consistent with that profile (i.e. for which hit has positive probability given σ
and ωi), let A
t
−i(σ−i, hit, ωi) = {a−i ∈ A−i|Prob(a
t
−i = a−i|hit, ωi, σ−i) > 0} be the set of partial
profiles that have positive probability in period t given player i’s information σ−i, hit and ωi. For
a strategy profile σ and any private history (ωi, hit) that is consistent with that profile, we say
that the action aij is promising for player i provided that given his information (σ−i, hit, ωi)
there is positive probability that it leads to a success. That is, given a strategy profile σ and
a private history (ωi, hit) that is consistent with that profile, the action aij is promising for
player i if Prob
{
{(aij , a−i) 6∈ A(ht)} ∩ {(aij , a−i)|a−i ∈ A
t
−i(σ−i, hit, ωi)}| ω
i, hit, σ−i
}
> 0. An
action aij is rank-dominated for a strategy profile σ following history (ω
i, hit) if there exists
a promising action aij′ such that ωij′ > ωij . An action aij is maximal for a strategy profile
σ following history (ωi, hit) if it is promising and rank–undominated or if no promising action
exists. Roughly speaking, given the behavior of all other players, a maximal action has the
highest probability of finding a success in the current period. We begin by observing that
players choose maximal actions on the path of play of any ordinal equilibrium.
Proposition 4 If a profile of ordinal strategies σ is an equilibrium, then for every ωi and every
history of actions hit that has positive probability given σ and ω
i, player i plays a maximal
action.
Proof: Suppose not. Then there exists a player i, a signal ωi and an action history hit
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that has positive probability given σ and ωi, following which there is positive probability
that player i plays an action aij′ that is not maximal. Hence, there exists an action aij′′
with Prob
{{
(aij′′ , a−i) 6∈ A(ht)
}
∩ {(aij′′ , a−i)|a−i ∈ A
t
−i(σ−i, hit, ωi)}| ω
i, hit, σ−i
}
> 0 and
r(aij′′ , ωi) > r(aij′ , ωi). Consider the signal ωˆi for which r(aij , ωˆi) = r(aij , ωi) ∀j and ωˆij =
1
r(aij′′ ,ωi)
for all j with r(aij , ωˆi) ≥ r(aij′′ , ωi) and ωˆij = 0 otherwise. Since σi is an ordinal strat-
egy, it prescribes the same behavior following (ωˆi, hit) as it does after (ωi, hit). Now consider
the following deviation after history (ωˆi, hit) : play a
′′
ij in period t and then after the resulting
history (ωˆi, (hit, aij′′)) use the continuation play that the original strategy σi would have pre-
scribed following (ωˆi, (hit, aij′)). Now there are two possibilities: Either playing aij′′ does induce
a success in period t, or it does not. In the latter case, there is no loss from the deviation since
for the signal ωˆi there would also not have been a success from using action aij′ in period t and
the sequence of realized action profiles following period t is identical to the one induced by the
original strategy. In the former case the deviation is profitable because of discounting. 
Conversely, we observe next that if players choose maximal actions along the path of play of
an ordinal strategy profile, then this strategy profile is an equilibrium. To this end, we say that
player i’s strategy σi is maximal against the partial profile σ−i if it prescribes a maximal action
for player i for every signal ωi and every action history hit that has positive probability given σ
and ωi. A strategy profile σ is maximal if σi is maximal against σ−i for all players i.
Proposition 5 If a profile σ of ordinal strategies is maximal, then it is an equilibrium.
The proof proceeds in four steps: (1) We show that if a profile of ordinal strategies σ is
maximal, then for every player j every pure strategy in the support of σj induces the same
actions in periods in which there is a positive probability of a success. (2) We conclude from (1)
that if σi is maximal against σ−i, then it is maximal against all s−i in the support of σ−i. (3)
We show that if σi is maximal against a pure strategy profile s−i then it is a best reply against
that profile. And finally, (4) we appeal to the fact that if σi is a best reply against every s−i in
the support of σ−i, then it is a best reply against σ−i itself.
Proof: For any strategy profile σ define pt(σ) as the (unconditional) probability of a success in
period t, let Θ+ := {t ∈ T |pt(σ) > 0} and Θ
0 := {t ∈ T |pt(σ) = 0}. Recall that for each player
j, pure strategy sj and signal ωj the action that is induced in period t is denoted by a
t
j(sj , ωj).
We claim that if a profile σ of ordinal strategies is maximal then atj(sj , ωj) = a
t
j(s
′
j , ωj) ∀t ∈
Θ+, ∀sj , s
′
j ∈ supp(σj), and for almost all ωj ∈ Ωj . We argue by induction on t. The claim is true
in period 1 because with a maximal strategy player j will take her highest probability action,
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and the probability of a tie among highest probability actions is zero. Suppose t ∈ Θ+ and the
claim holds for all τ < t. With σ−j fixed and the claim being true for all τ < t the maximal
action in period t is independent of which sj ∈ supp(σj) player j used before time t since by the
inductive hypothesis all of these pure strategies have induce the same action sequences before
time t, except possibly in the event of a tie in the probabilities that the signal ωj assigns to
actions, which occurs with probability zero.
Since for all j 6= i we have atj(sj , ωj) = a
t
j(s
′
j , ωj) ∀t ∈ Θ
+, ∀sj , s
′
j ∈ supp(σj), for almost
all ωj ∈ Ωj , for periods t ∈ Θ
+ player i’s maximal action, after having adhered to σi before
time t, is the same for all s−i ∈ σ−i. Now consider t ∈ Θ
0. Since ordinal strategies are mappings
from histories and rankings into actions, there are only finitely many ordinal pure strategies.
Therefore for every player j every pure strategy in the support of σj has positive probability.
Therefore if pt(σ) = 0, then pt(σi, s−i) = 0 for all s−i in the support of σ−i. This implies that
any action that is maximal in period t ∈ Θ0 against σ−i remains maximal against every s−i in
the support of σ−i. Together these two observations show that if σi is maximal against σ−i, then
it is also maximal against every s−i in the support of σ−i.
Next, we show that if σi is maximal against the partial profile of pure strategies s−i, then it
is a best reply against that profile. Take any pure strategy si that is in the support of player
i’s mixed strategy σi. We will show by way of contradiction that si is a best reply against s−i.
Suppose that this is not the case. Then there exists a signal ωi and a pure strategy s
′
i such
that player i’s expected payoff conditional on having observed signal ωi satisfies πi(s
′
i, s−i;ωi) >
πi(s;ωi). Let τ be the first period in which a
τ ((s′i, s−i), ω) 6= a
τ (s, ω). Note that τ is independent
of ω−i. There are two possibilities: Either a
τ ((s′i, s−i), ω) ∈ A
τ−1(s, ω), or aτ ((s′i, s−i), ω) ∈
A \Aτ−1(s, ω) in which case ωi(a
τ
i ((s
′
i, s−i), ω)) ≤ ωi(a
τ
i (s, ω)) since by assumption si assigns a
maximal action after every positive probability history. Let θ > τ be the first period in which
aτ−i(s, ω) = a
θ
−i(s, ω) in case that such a θ exists. Note that θ is independent of ω.
Consider a strategy s′′i with
ati(s
′′
i , ω) = a
t
i(s
′
i, ω) ∀t 6= τ, θ
aτi (s
′′
i , ω) = a
τ
i (si, ω)
aθi (s
′′
i , ω) = a
τ
i (s
′
i, ω).
Evidently, either this raises the probability of finding a success in period τ by the same amount
that it lowers it in period θ, or the two probabilities are the same. Because of discounting, in
both cases replacing s′i with s
′′
i weakly raises the payoff for the signal ωi.
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If there is no θ > τ with aτ−i(s, ω) = a
θ
−i(s, ω), replace s
′
i with a strategy s
′′
i such that
ati(s
′′
i , ω) = a
t
i(s
′
i, ω) ∀t 6= τ
aτi (s
′′
i , ω) = a
τ
i (s, ω).
Evidently, also in this case, the payoff of type ωi weakly increases.
Iterating this procedure generates a sequence of action profiles that converges to at(s, ω).
Furthermore the payoff of type ωi is non-decreasing at each step of the iteration, contradicting
the assumption that s′i induces a strictly higher payoff for type ωi than si against s−i. This
confirms that the strategy si is a best response against s−i.
Finally, observe that this is true for every s−i in the support of σ−i and for every si in the
support of σi. It follows that σi is a best reply against σ−i. 
Propositions 4 and 5 show that ordinal equilibria have a simple structure: Actions profiles
that are higher (in a vector sense based on the players’ signal) are tried before lower profiles.
There is substantial multiplicity of such equilibria because the ordering is not complete and
therefore coordination on an ordinal equilibria is difficult. If, however, coordination on an ordinal
equilibrium is achieved by some mechanism this equilibrium will prove remarkably robust.
We now argue that every ordinal equilibrium outcome is sequentially rational by proving
that it can be supported by an EPBE. For any ordinal equilibrium profile σ classify histories
on the path of play as relevant and all other histories as irrelevant. Take any strategy profile
σ˜ that coincides with σ on the path of play. We need to argue that playing according to σi
remains a best response to σ˜−i for any history on the path of play. In an ordinal equilibrium
there exists a commonly known first period τ with the property that either a success is achieved
with probability one in a period t ≤ τ or τ is the final period. Because a deviation of player
i is not detected prior to period τ , it does not change the behavior of all other players in any
period t ≤ τ . Since given the behavior of all other players, player i plays a maximal action in
every period t ≤ τ , a deviation by i cannot increase his expected payoff conditional on finding
a success prior to τ , and it must lower it whenever a success is found after period τ . Hence, it
remains optimal to play according to σi on the path of play. We thus have:
Proposition 6 Any ordinal equilibrium outcome can be supported by an EPBE and thus is
sequentially rational.
Observe that the equilibria characterized in Propositions 4 and 5 include (i) equilibria in
which all profiles are examined without repetition, (ii) equilibria in which search stops before all
profiles have been examined, and (iii) infinitely many Pareto-ranked equilibria in which search
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is temporarily suspended and then resumed. Reconsider the example illustrated in in Figure
1, where ai,j denotes the j-th action of player i, and wlog we ranked these actions in the order
of the corresponding signals. Then, (i) there is an equilibrium in which the profile labeled t is
played in period t = 1, . . . , 6, (ii) another equilibrium in which the profile labeled t is played in
period t = 1, . . . , 4 after which profile 1 is played forever, and (iii), for any k with k > 0 and
k < T − 4 there is an equilibrium in which the profile labeled t is played in period t = 1, . . . , 4
after which profile 1 is played for k period followed by play of profiles 5 and 6.
Somewhat counter-intuitively, one can therefore construct ordinal equilibria in which search
ends prematurely, or is temporarily suspended, that survive elimination of dominated strategies.
To see this, return to our example with two players, two actions, a uniform signal distribution,
but now with T ≥ 4 periods. For the row player let H (L) denote taking the high (low)
probability action, regardless of the value of the signal. For the column player, use lower case
letters, i.e. h and l, to describe the same behavior. Then G1G2 . . . GT with Gt ∈ {H,L} is the
strategy of the row player that prescribes taking the action Gt in period t regardless of the value
of the signal, and similarly for the column player.
Suppose that the row player believes that the column player uses the strategy hlhhhhh . . . h
with probability 1 − ǫ and the strategies lllhl . . . l, llllhl . . . l, . . . , llll . . . lhl and llll . . . llh each
with probability ǫT−3 . Then the strategy HHLH . . .H is a unique best reply for almost every
realization of the row player’s signal (and a best reply for every signal realization). This implies
that HHLH . . .H is an undominated strategy for the row player. By an analogous argument
it follows that hlh . . . h is an undominated strategy for the column player. Hence, we have an
equilibrium in undominated strategies in which search terminates after the third period, even if
until that point there has been no success and there are arbitrarily many future search periods
left.
If we discretize the game by considering signal distributions with a finite support, we have a
finite game and can check equilibria for trembling-hand perfection. It is well known that in finite
two-player games the set of (normal form) perfect equilibria coincides with the set of equilibria
in undominated strategies. As a consequence, in the discrete approximation of our game the
equilibrium (HHLH . . .H, hlh . . . h) is (normal form) perfect. In this sense, the equilibrium is
robust and similar constructions can be found in the case with more player and or actions.
Although even these clearly suboptimal equilibria satisfy the spirit of trembling-hand per-
fection, in our interpretation of routines as being selected by management, it is implausible that
such routines would be selected. Management would clearly prefer to select an optimal routine
to a suboptimal one and hence we now show that an optimal routine exists and characterize it.
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Denote the random variable that is player i’s signal by ω˜i, to distinguish it from the signal
realization ωi, and let ω˜i(n) stand for the nth (highest) order statistic of the random vector
ω˜i. Define ωi(n) as the expectation E[ω˜i(n)] of the nth order statistic of player i’s signal. For
every realization ωi, use ai(ni)(ωi) to denote the action of player i with the nith highest signal
according to ωi. For any i and n, let ai(n) denote the rule of playing the nth highest action for
any signal realization ωi. Refer to the rule ai(n) as player i’s nth rank-labeled action and to every
(a1(n1), a2(n2), . . . , aI(nI)) as a rank-labeled action profile.
Proposition 7 An optimal ordinal equilibrium exists and in any optimal ordinal equilibrium
agents play a sequence of rank-labeled action profiles in the order of their ex ante success prob-
ability without repetition.
Proof: If we use (n1, n2, . . . , nI), ni ∈ {n ∈ N1|n ≤ m
i} to label the rank-ordered action profile
in which player i plays her nith ranked action, the path in which rank-ordered profiles are played
in lexicographic order, (1, . . . 1, 1), (1, . . . , 1, 2) . . ., is maximal. Hence, Proposition 5 implies that
there is always an ordinal equilibrium that induces a search path without repetitions.
From Proposition 4 we know that in any ordinal equilibrium in any period with a positive
success probability each player uses a maximal action. Therefore, every ordinal equilibrium
induces a deterministic sequence of times t at which a novel rank-labeled action profile at is
played; at any other time s players must induce a distribution over rank-labeled action profiles
that have been used earlier and for those times we introduce a generic symbol ∗ that represents
“repetition”. Call any sequence {bt}Tt=1 where each b
t is either a novel rank-labeled action profile
at or a repetition ∗ an ordinal search path. Clearly, among ordinal search paths, those that induce
repetitions (before all rank-labeled action profiles have been exhausted) are dominated. Since
there are only finitely many ordinal search paths without repetitions, there must be a payoff
maximizing one.
Consider any ordinal equilibrium σ that induces a payoff maximizing search path. Proposi-
tion 4 implies that under σ players choose maximal actions in any period with a positive success
probability by Proposition 4. Hence, the expected payoff from the profile σ is the present dis-
counted value of expected payoffs from profiles of maximal actions. These expected payoffs can
be obtained as follows: Given any signal vector ω, and assuming that player i takes action aiji
the expected success probability is ω1j1 ×ω2j2 × · · · ×ωIjI . In case the action taken by players i
corresponds to the nith order statistic of her signal ωi, the expected success probability equals
ω1(n1)×ω2(n2)×· · ·×ωI(nI). If each player i follows the rule ai(ni) the expected success probability
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equals ∫
x1 × x2 × · · · × xIdFn1,n2,...nI (x1, x2, . . . , xI)
where Fn1,n2,...nI is the joint distribution of the nith order statistics of all players i. By inde-
pendence, if we let Fni denote the distribution of the nith order statistic of player i’s signal ωi,
this equals ∫
x1dFn1(x1)×
∫
x2dFn2(x2)× · · · ×
∫
xIdFnI (xI)
= ω1(n1) × ω2(n2) × · · · × ωI(nI).
Because of discounting, the strategy profile σ must prescribes to play the rank-labeled action
profiles (a1(n1), a2(n2), . . . , aI(nI)) in the order of the probabilities ω1(n1) × ω2(n2) × · · · × ωI(nI).

Having specified the class of ordinal equilibria and found the optimal equilibrium in this
class, we turn to highlight the robustness of these routine equilibria. Loosely speaking, we begin
by showing that the class of ordinal equilibria coincide with the class of ex post equilibria. An
equilibrium is an ex post equilibrium if each player’s strategy remains a best response even after
learning the other players’ private information. Since ex post equilibria induce best replies for
every signal distribution, they do not depend on the distribution that generates players’ signals
or the beliefs that players have about signals are generated. Another consequence in our setting
is that an outsider without knowledge about how signals are generated or how players form
their beliefs could step in and help coordination by suggesting an ordinal equilibrium profile.
That ordinal equilibria are ex post is intuitive given the fact that our informal discussion at the
beginning of this section made no references to the underlying signal distribution; once I know
that one of my partner switches after the first period with probability one, it is a best response
for everyone else to stick to their high probability action independent of the signal realizations;
and once everyone else does not switch, is is clearly a best response for the designated player to
switch independent of his and other players’ private information. Similarly, in later periods—as
long as they are promising—exactly one player will switch to a lower probability action and
given the behavior of other players, this is optimal independent of the signal realization. But
it is worth emphasizing that we also show that basically only ordinal equilibria are ex post.
Hence a management that wants a robust solution with respect to the underlying distribution
needs to select a routine. Finally, in Proposition 10 we show that routines are also hyper-
cursed equilibria: they are robust to a wide variety of incorrect beliefs by the team members.
A management having to deal with less than perfectly rational agents may thus benefit from
selecting routines, which are robust to a variety of behavioral biases documented in the literature
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on behavioral economics.
The following proposition, which focuses on pure strategies, shows a simple and clean equiv-
alence of the set of ordinal and the set of ex post equilibria. We discuss more general results for
mixed strategies below (Proposition 9).
Proposition 8 The set of pure-strategy ex-post equilibria coincides with the set of pure-strategy
ordinal equilibria.
Proof: We first show that every ordinal equilibrium σ is an ex-post equilibrium (for this direction
the restriction to pure strategies is not needed). According to Proposition 4, in an ordinal
equilibrium in every period in which there is a positive probability of a success, a player plays a
maximal action. The property of an action being maximal for player i does not depend whether
or not the entire signal vector i is known; i.e., an action that is maximal for player i when ω−i
is private information remains maximal when ω−i is made public. Thus even when the signal
vector ω is publicly known there is no instantaneous gain from switching to a different action in
any period in which there is a positive probability of a success. Evidently, in periods in which
there is no positive probability of success, even with knowledge of ω−i, there is no instantaneous
gain from deviating from σ. Since actions are not observed, failure to play a maximal action now
also has no effect on future play of other players. Therefore, it remains optimal to maximize
the instantaneous probability of success by taking a maximal action and hence σ is an ex-post
equilibrium.
For the converse consider a pure-strategy ex-post equilibrium σ˜. With pure strategies, if
signals are public, a player knows in every period the set of profiles she can induce in that
period. For example, if it is known that in period t the partial strategy profile σ˜−i induces the
partial action profile a−i, then player i can induce the set of profiles P (a−i) := {a
′ ∈ A|a′−i =
a−i}. These sets partition the set of all strategy profiles A. Therefore, whenever a player can
induce the action profile a, the set of profiles she can induce is P (a−i); call this her option
set. With pure strategies and ω public, in any period τ in which her option set, as determined
by profile σ˜ equals O(τ, σ˜) player i also knows the subset of profiles N(τ, σ˜−i, hiτ ) ⊆ O(τ, σ˜)
that have not already been chosen. Since actions are not observable, player i’s choice in period
t does not affect her opponents’ choices in periods τ > t. Also, if her option set in period
t is O(t, σ˜) = P (a−i), then her choice in period t, does not directly affect N(τ, σ˜−i, hiτ ) in
periods τ > t with O(τ, σ˜) 6= P (a−i). Therefore, her choice in period t only determines the
probability of a success in that period and the composition N(τ ′, σ˜−i, hiτ ) in periods τ
′ > t with
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O(τ ′, σ˜) = O(t, σ˜). Therefore in period t she effectively faces the problem making an optimal
sequence of choices from the set N(t, σ˜), where each choice induces a fixed probability of a
success. Given discounting, it is optimal to induce profiles in O(t, σ˜) in decreasing order of the
magnitude of these probabilities, i.e. to take a maximal action in every period. Therefore in an
ex post equilibrium players must use maximal strategies conditional on signals being public. A
pure strategy that is maximal with publicly known signals remains maximal with private signals
because only the ranking of one’s own signal matters in the determination of whether a action
is maximal. Hence, the pure-strategy ex post equilibrium σ˜ is an ordinal equilibrium. 
It is immediate from the proof of Proposition 8 that ordinal equilibria are ex post even when
we allow for mixed strategies. One may wonder wether mixed-strategy ex post equilibria also
coincide with ordinal equilibria. To understand intuitively, why this is not the case reconsider
the example illustrated in Figure 1. Then if T = 6 there exists an ordinal equilibrium in
which in periods t = 1, · · · , 5 the corresponding action profile is played, so that on the path
of play all but the a priori-least likely action profile have been played prior to the final period.
In the final period player 1 plays his first action (a1,1) while Player two randomizes (with any
given probability) between the two more likely actions (a2,1, a2,2); in this incomplete-search
equilibrium no player can deviate in final period and induce a positive probability of success.
Note also that this ordinal equilibrium is ex post, which follows from the above arguments for
the first 5 periods and the fact that independent of the signal realization no player can induce
a success in the final period. If this randomization by Player 2, however, conditions on more
than her ordinal ranking of signals, the resulting equilibrium is not ordinal and yet ex post.
What our next proposition establishes, is that ex post equilibria differ from ordinal equilibria
only with regard to such inconsequential randomization in which players randomize between
multiple maximal action—i.e. randomize in non-promising periods. Thus, subject to this minor
qualification, the behavior in ex post equilibria coincides with that in ordinal equilibria: The
set of (mixed-strategy) ex post equilibria share with ordinal equilibria the property of inducing
maximal actions in every period.
Proposition 9 In any ex post equilibrium every player plays a maximal action in every period.
Proof: Let the strategy profile σ be an ex-post equilibrium profile. In order to derive a con-
tradiction, suppose there is a period and a player who does not play a maximal action in that
period. Let τ be the first period in which this is the case and let player i be the player who does
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not play a maximal action in period τ. Now consider the case in which each player j 6= i has
received a signal ωˆj that puts probability zero on all actions that are ranked lower than their
maximal action in period τ. Then all these players must play their maximal action, denoted a∗j ,
in period τ. This is the case since all other actions in the current period induce a zero success
probability, since a player can always follow the same action sequence in the future as the one
prescribed by σj and since there is no effect on the future play of other players from player j’s
current choice. Note that each player k must play his maximal action a∗k in period τ with posi-
tive probability. This is the case because it is strictly optimal to do so for the signal that puts
zero probability on all lower ranked actions, and for any action sequence λ his payoffs are con-
tinuous in his signals. In an ex-post equilibrium, i’s maximal action must remain maximal when
all players j 6= i play their maximal action. Suppose not, then a lower ranked action than i’s
maximal action has positive probability of success when all players j 6= i play a∗j but the action
a∗i does not have positive probability of success. Furthermore, this remains true when we restrict
attention to signal realizations for which player i plays a∗i according to σi. For such signals i
would want to change his behavior ex post. For the signal realization where each player j 6= i
observes ωˆj and an action ai that player i plays with positive probability in period τ according
to σi, the action profile (ai, a−i) has a positive probability of a success in any period t ≥ τ only
if all players j play a∗j . To see this, first note that if any player j uses a lower ranked action than
her maximal action a∗j , the success probability is zero. Second, observe that since (a
∗
1, . . . , a
∗
I)
is maximal in period τ, for any action aiτ that i plays with positive probability in period τ any
action profile (a′1, . . . , a
′
i−1, ai,τ , a
′
i+1, . . . , a
′
I) with a
′
j ≻ a
∗
j for some j 6= i and a
′
j  a
∗
j for all j 6= i
has zero probability of inducing a success. This can be shown as follows: Since (a∗1, . . . , a
∗
I) is
maximal, it follows from before that this action profile is played with positive probability. Hence
(a′1, . . . , a
∗
i−1, aiτ , a
∗
i+1, . . . , a
∗
I) has zero probability of inducing a success. Similarly, the profile
(a∗1, a
′
2, a
∗
2, . . . , a
∗
i−1, aiτ , a
∗
i+1, . . . , a
∗
I) has zero probability of inducing a success. Thus both of
these action profiles have been played before and because by assumption in periods prior to τ
only maximal actions have been played, the profile (a′1, a
′
2, a
∗
2, . . . , a
∗
i−1, aiτ , a
∗
i+1, . . . , a
∗
I) must
have have been played before. 
Note that the above Propositions 7 and 9 imply that an optimal routine is also an optimal
it ex post equilibrium, and that an optimal ex post equilibrium is a routine.
We now turn to illustrate the robustness of routines to behavioral biases, beginning with a
lack of strategic sophistication by players that is formally incorporated in the concept of cursed
equilibria. In a fully cursed equilibrium (Eyster and Rabin [2005]) every type of every player best
responds to the correct probability distribution over the other players’ actions that is induced by
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their equilibrium strategies, but does not properly attribute these actions to the other players’
private information. To state this condition formally in our setting, we need to introduce some
notation: For any strategy profile σ (with a slight abuse of notation) denote by σ−i(λ−i|ω−i)
the probability with which players other than i follow the partial profile of action sequences λ−i
if their signals are given by ω−i. Since σ−i(λ−i|ω−i) =
∏
j 6=i σj(λj |ωj), it is measurable and thus
we can define the expected average play of others as
σ−i(λ−i|ωi) :=
∫
Ω−i
σ−i(λ−i|ω−i)dpi(ω−i|ωi),
where pi(·|ωi) is player i’s posterior distribution over the other team members’ signals conditional
on her own. Then σ is a fully cursed equilibrium if for every i, ωi ∈ Ωi and every action sequence
λˆi ∈ supp[σi(·|ωi)],
λˆi ∈ argmax
λi
∫
Ω−i
∑
λ−i∈Λ−i
u(λ, ω)σ−i(λ−i|ωi)dpi(ω−i|ωi),
where u(λ, ω) denotes the (common) expected payoff if the signal realization is ω and players
follow the profile of action sequences λ. Note that because of signal independence in our case
pi(ω−i|ωi) = F−i(ω−i), and σ−i(λ−i|ωi) simplifies to
σ−i(λ−i) =
∏
j 6=i
∫
Ωj
σj(λj |ωj)dFj(ωj).
While cursedness captures the idea that players underestimate the extent to which other
players action depend on their information, our ordinal equilibria are robust to many other biases
in information processing. To illustrate this, we will considerably strengthen the cursedness
requirement in several dimensions, and show that pure-strategy ordinal equilibria satisfy these
conditions.
First, while cursedness requires a player to correctly predict the distribution of other players’
action sequences, we can relax this assumption and ask instead that the player merely correctly
predicts the support of the distribution. Formally, we strengthen the robustness requirement
by asking that σ satisfies the condition that for every player i, own signal ωi ∈ Ωi, profile of
other players’ action sequences λ−i ∈ ∪ω′−i supp[σ−i(λ−i, ω
′
−i)], and every own action sequence
λˆi ∈ supp[σi(·|ωi)]:
λˆi ∈ argmax
λi
u(λ, ω) ∀ ω−i.
We refer to any σ that has this property as a strongly cursed equilibrium. In a strongly
cursed equilibrium, a player must best respond to any action sequence played by others on the
path of play—independent of what the true type of other players is. It is thus robust to any
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misperception of how other players’ equilibrium behavior depends on their information. For
example, the frequency with which a player thinks his partner’s play a given sequence need not
match this frequency in equilibrium. In our organizational interpretation in which a routine
is selected by a management that cannot observe the team members’ private information, this
requirement can also be interpreted as a weak-accountability condition in the sense that every
player believes that his fellow team members choose only action sequences that can be justified
in front of the management as being consistent with the management’s order for some possible
private signal realization.
Second, a player may also put positive weight on some action sequences that are not played in
equilibrium as long as she correctly predicts when other players switch between actions and when
previously chosen actions are repeated. As an example, think of a player who has three actions
of which the third action is always the least likely action. Consider a candidate equilibrium in a
two-period game in which she is meant to always play the most likely action. Then, for example,
we allow her partner to misperceive her behavior of not switching as always playing the third
action even though this is never the most likely action. To capture this formally, for any set Λ˜−i
of profiles of action sequences of other players use L(Λ˜−i) to denote the set that is obtained by
replacing any action sequence λk = (a
1
k, . . . a
T
k ) of any player k 6= i by ℓ(λk) = (ℓ(a
1
k), . . . ℓ(a
T
k ))
where ℓ is any permutation of player k’s set of actions Ak. Then we ask that σ satisfy the
condition that for every player i, own signal ωi ∈ Ωi, λ−i ∈ L
(
∪ω′−i supp[σ−i(λ−i, ω
′
−i)]
)
, and
every own action sequence λˆi ∈ supp[σi(·|ωi)]:
λˆi ∈ argmax
λi
u(λ, ω) ∀ ω−i.
Third, in addition to the above misperceptions of other players’ behaviors, we can allow for a
player to misinterpret her own signal as longs as the ranking of her own signals remains correct.
For example, in a setting in which a player’s signals are the result of her ability to understand and
analyze the basic problem, overconfidence may result in her thinking that the most likely action
is part of a success profile with a higher than appropriate probability. Similarly, if a player’s
signal comes from repeatedly drawing from her signal distribution, the belief-in-small-numbers
bias may often lead to overconfidence. Whatever the exact driver of incorrect own beliefs, a
player will want to stick to the prescribed play, and in addition the true expected payoffs of the
ordinal equilibrium are unaffected by these biases.
Putting it all together, we say that an equilibrium σ is a hyper-cursed equilibrium if
for any player i, true signal ωi and perceived own signal ω˜i that satisfies r(ω˜i) = r(ωi), λ−i ∈
30
L
(
∪ω′−i supp[σ−i(λ−i, ω
′
−i)]
)
, and every own action sequence λˆi ∈ supp[σi(·|ωi)]:
λˆi ∈ argmax
λi
u(λ, (ω˜i, ω−i)) ∀ ω−i.
As our next result shows, in our setting pure-strategy ordinal equilibria are hyper-cursed
equilibria, as well as conventional Bayesian equilibria. Intuitively, what matters for a given
player is that the other players follow a particular pattern of play—i.e. of switching between
their various actions—and not on how the realization of this pattern depends on players’ signal
realizations. In terms of our 2x2x2 example, even if the other team member incorrectly plays his
low-probability action first, it is optimal to respond with playing ones high-probability action
in the first period. Furthermore, if my team members doesn’t switch, it is optimal to switch
in the second period and if my team member switches, it is optimal to keep playing the high
probability action. And if players play a routine they only condition on the rank of their signals
and hence a misperception of their own signal strength is inconsequential as long the ranking of
own signals is unaffected. Thus routines are hyper cursed.
Proposition 10 Every pure-strategy ordinal equilibrium is hyper cursed.
Proof: Let s be a pure-strategy ordinal equilibrium. For every player k and any signal ωk that
that player might receive, denote by λk(sk, ωk) the path of player k’s actions that is induced by
her strategy sk and signal ωk.
Note that in an ordinal equilibrium for any player k and any two signals ωk and ω˜k with
r(ω˜k) = r(ωk) we have λk(sk, ωk) = λk(sk, ω˜k). Since in addition we are only considering pure-
strategy equilibria, it suffices to check that for every player i, every signal ωi ∈ Ωi of that player,
every partial profile of action sequences λ−i ∈ L
(
∪ω˜−i{λ−i(s−i, ω˜−i)}
)
of other players, and
every own action sequence λi(si, ωi), one has
λi(si, ωi) ∈ argmax
λi
u(λ, ω) ∀ ω−i.
This, however, is implied by three facts: (1) fixing any ordinal profile of other players, a
maximal strategy for player i against that profile is a best response against that profile; (2) a
period is promising for an ordinal strategy profile if and only if it promising for any permutations
of any equilibrium action sequences of other players; and, (3) for player i the property of a
strategy being maximal is preserved as long as the behavior pattern of other players does not
change, i.e. as long as every other player plays some permutation of one of her equilibrium action
sequences.
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We have the following trivial consequence:
Corollary 1 Every pure-strategy ordinal equilibrium is fully cursed.
5 Optimal Equilibria
Having characterized routines and shown that their robustness generalizes from the 2 × 2 × 2
uniform-signal example to games with an arbitrary finite number of players, an arbitrary finite
(not necessarily identical) number of actions per player, any finite time horizon and a rich class
of signal distributions that satisfy the assumptions of signal and action independence, we now
turn to lessons on optimal equilibria that generalize from the earlier example to this entire class
of games. We demonstrate that: (1) it is impossible to implement ex post optimal search; (2)
optimal equilibria exist and have a simple form—they partition the signal space into convex sets;
and (3) typically optimal equilibria are cardinal, i.e. players condition on their signal strength
in addition to the ranking of signals. Thus, the robustness of (optimal) routines comes typically
at the cost of being a suboptimal equilibrium.
The impossibility of ex post-optimal search is a simple consequence of the fact that the
knowledge required to implement it is distributed across players. Ex post-optimal search would
require that players calculate the success probability of each action profile conditional on their
joint information and then try action profiles in declining order of these probabilities. To see
that this is not an equilibrium strategy with the available information, note that for almost any
signal vector ωˆi of player i there exists a positive probability set of signal vectors of others players
such that the full-information optimal strategy has player i change his action from period one to
period two. At the same time, for the same signal ωˆi of player i, there is a positive probability set
of signal vectors of other players for which the full-information optimal strategy prescribes that
player i does not change his action between periods one and period two. This behavior cannot
be achieved in equilibrium since player i’s behavior can only depend on his own information
Given that ex post-optimal search is not feasible, the next question is how well one can do
while respecting the players’ informational constraints. In order to address this question, we
first note that the sets of optimal and of Nash equilibrium profiles can be analyzed in terms of
mappings from signals to distributions over action sequences. Since player i has mi actions, he
can follow one of
(
mi
)T
possible action sequences in the T -period game. We denote a typical
action sequence of this kind for player i by λi and the set of such action sequences for player
i by Λi. We show in the appendix that in the present environment the sets of optimal and of
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Nash equilibrium profiles can be fully characterized in terms of the action-sequence mappings
χi : Ωi → ∆(Λi). This is a consequence of our assumption that players cannot observe and
therefore cannot condition their behavior on each others’ actions.
Every strategy σi of player i induces a mapping χi|σi : Ωi → ∆(Λi) from signals into
distributions over action sequences. Strategies are particularly simple if they are pure and
the induced action sequence mappings are measurable with respect to a finite partition. This
motivates the following definition:
Definition 1 If there exists a finite partition P of the signal space of player i such that the
action-equence mapping χi|σi : Ωi → ∆(Λi) is measurable with respect to P, then σi is a parti-
tion strategy with respect to P.
In the 2× 2× 2-uniform example optimal strategies are cutoff strategies and thus partition
strategies. In addition, the partition elements are intervals. The following definition generalizes
this property to multi-dimensional signal spaces.
Definition 2 A partition strategy with respect to a partition P is a convex partition strategy
if the elements of P are convex.
Our next result shows that optimal strategies exists and that it is without loss of generality
to consider strategies that have a simple form. The statement also contains a reminder that as
we noted earlier, optimal strategies are equilibria.
Proposition 11 There exists an optimal strategy profile in convex partition strategies and any
optimal profile is an equilibrium profile.
The proof of Proposition 11 is in the appendix. It first establishes the fact that a player’s
payoff from an action sequence is linear in his signal for any partial profile of strategies of other
players. This observation is then used to argue that for any strategy profile there exists a profile
of convex partition strategies that yields an at least equally high payoff and can be described in
terms of a bounded number of points. The space of such strategy profiles is compact and the
common payoff is continuous in this class. Hence an optimal strategy profil exists.
Next we identify signal distributions for which one can improve on the best ordinal equi-
librium. Since optimal strategy profiles are equilibrium profiles in our common interest envi-
ronment, it suffices to show that one can improve on the best ordinal equilibrium in order to
show that the best equilibrium strategy profile is cardinal. Lemma 1 proves this result for a
class of distributions with mass points. Proposition 12 shows that in the neighborhood of any
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distribution in this class one can find distributions without mass points for which the result
continues to hold.
Say that a player’s signal distributions has a mass point at certainty if there is positive
probability that he receives a signal that singles out one of his actions as the one that is part of
a success profile. If a player receives such a signal, we say that he is certain. Similarly, say that
a player’s signal distributions has a mass point at indifference if there is positive probability
that he receives a signal that assigns equal probability to each of his actions as being part of a
success profile. In the event that he receives such a signal, we say that the player is indifferent.
Denote by ECi the event that i is certain and by E
I
i the event that he is indifferent.
Lemma 1 If all players’ signal distributions have mass points at certainty and at indifference,
any optimal equilibrium is cardinal.
Proof: From Proposition 4 it follows that for any ordinal equilibrium σ, there is a pure-strategy
ordinal equilibrium s that is payoff equivalent to σ. For a given ω, label player i’ actions in the
sequence in which they are first used by s. Label actions that are not used by s arbitrarily.
Since s is an ordinal equilibrium, ai1 is the action of player i with the highest probability of
success. In any ordinal equilibrium s, there will be one player, i, who switches in period two, and
another player, k, who does not switch in period two. Modify the behavior of these two players
as follows: Let i never switch from his first-period action when he is certain. Have k switch in
period two to his action ak2 when he is indifferent. Have k otherwise not change his behavior,
except that in case there exists a first period τ > 2 in which aτ (s, ω) = (ak2, a
2
−k(s, ω)), he takes
the action a2k1, instead of a
2
k2 in period τ. Formally, define s
′ such that s′−{i,k} = s−{i,k}, i.e. s
coincides with s′ for all players other than i and k, and
ati(s
′
i, ω) = a
t
i(si, ω) ∀ωi ∈ Ωi \ E
C
i , ∀t
ati(s
′
i, ω) = a
1
i (si, ω) ∀ωi ∈ E
C
i , ∀t
atk(s
′
k, ω) = a
t
k(sk, ω) ∀ωk ∈ Ωk \ E
I
k , ∀t
a2k(s
′
k, ω) 6= a
1
k(sk, ω) ∀ωk ∈ E
I
k
aτk(s
′
k, ω) = a
1
k(sk, ω) ∀ωk ∈ E
I
k
atk(s
′
k, ω) = a
t
k(sk, ω) ∀ωk ∈ E
I
k , ∀t 6= 2, τ
There are four possible cases: (1) If player i is uncertain and player k is not indifferent, then
the sequence in which cells are examined under the modified strategy profile s′ is the same as in
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the original equilibrium s, and therefore payoffs are the same as well. (2) If player i is certain
and player k is not indifferent, then player i is using a dominant action and all other players are
following the same behavior as under s−i. Consequently, the expected payoff cannot be lower
than from all players using strategy s. (3) If player i is uncertain and player k is indifferent, the
only effect of changing from s to s′ is that the order in which two cells are visited is reversed.
Furthermore, these cells are only distinguished by player k’s action and player k is indifferent.
Hence payoffs are unchanged in this case. (4) If player i is certain and player k is indifferent, the
cell examined in period two has a positive success probability under s′, whereas that probability
is zero under s. Furthermore, since player i is using a dominant action, and all players other
than players i and k do not change their behavior, the overall effect of switching from s to s′
is to move the examination of higher probability profiles forward. Therefore, in this case the
expected payoff increases. 
Next, we show that the ability to improve on the best ordinal equilibrium does not critically
depend on the distribution of signals having mass points.
Proposition 12 For each player i, let Fi have an everywhere positive density fi. Then there
exist sequences of distributions Fn,i with everywhere positive densities fn,i and an N > 0 such
that each Fn,i converges weakly to Fi and for all n > N , any optimal equilibrium is cardinal.
Proof: Let eij ∈ Ωi be the signal for player i that assigns probability one to the jth action
of player i being required for a success profile, and let zi ∈ Ω be the signal that assigns equal
probability to each action of player i being required for a success profile. Define Ei to be the dis-
tribution of player i’s signals that assigns probability one to the set of signals {ei1, . . . , eiJ(i), zi}
and equal probability to all signals in that set.
Let ζn ∈ (0, 1) and ζn → 0. Define Gn,i = ζnEi + (1 − ζn)Fi as the distribution that draws
ωi with probability ζn from the distribution Ei and with probability (1 − ζn) from Fi and let
Gn =
∏I
i=1Gn,i. Then {Gn,i}
∞
n=1 is a sequence of distributions converging weakly to Fi, denoted
Gn,i
w−→ Fi, where each Gn,i has mass points at indifference and at certainty. Let Ei,k be the
distribution of player i’s signals that assigns probability one to the set of signals Ω˜i ⊂ Ωi that are
within (Hausdorff) distance 1k from the set {ei1, . . . , eimi , zi} and that is uniform on Ω˜i. Define
Hn,i,k = ζnEi,k + (1− ζn)Fi and let Hn,k =
∏I
i=1Hn,i,k. Then each {Hn,i,k}
∞
k=1 is a sequence of
distribution functions with Hn,i,k
w−→ Gn,i where each Hn,i,k has an everywhere positive density,
and Hn,k
w−→ Gn.
An optimal ordinal strategy examines a new cell in every period in which that is still feasible.
Since there are only finitely many paths of play that do so, an optimal ordinal strategy σkn for
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Hn,k exists. Finiteness of the set of such play paths also implies that there is a subsequence of
{Hn,k}
∞
k=1 for which (after reindexing) each {σ
k
n}
∞
k=1 induces the same play path. From now on
consider this subsequence, and pick a strategy σn that induces this path of play.
Given a signal realization ω, denote player i’s expected payoff from the strategy profile σ by
vi(σ, ω). Then, for any strategy profile σ and signal distribution F, player i’s expected payoff
Ui(σ, F ) is
Ui(σ, F ) =
∫
vi(σ, ω)dF (ω).
Let 1{σ,a,t} be the indicator function of the event that profile a is visited for the first time in
period t under strategy σ and let P (a|ω) stand for the probability that the profile a is a success
given the signal vector ω. Then, for an ordinal strategy σ˜, player i’s payoff for a fixed ω has the
form
vi(σ˜, ω) =
T∑
t=1
δt−1
(∑
a∈A
1{σ˜,a,t}(ω)P (a|ω)
)
.
Here P (a|ω) is a polynomial in the elements of ω and therefore varies continuously with ω.
Since σ˜ is ordinal, for any time t the quantity
∑
a∈A 1{σ˜,a,t}(ω)P (a|ω) varies continuously with
ω: This holds because variations in ω that do not change the ranking of actions do not affect
the value of the indicator function, and at points ω˜ where the indicator function switches from
assigning the value 1 to a′ to assigning it to a′′, we have P (a′|ω˜) = P (a′′|ω˜). Taken together,
these observations imply that vi(σ˜, ω) is continuous in ω. Hence, by weak convergence of Hn,k
to Gn, we have
Ui(σ˜, Hn,k)→ Ui(σ˜, Gn),
for any ordinal strategy σ˜. Therefore, σn must be an optimal ordinal strategy for Gn.
For a given Gn, denote by σ
′
n the improvement strategy for σn, that we constructed in the
proof of Lemma 1. For any given σ′n, σn and ǫ ∈ (0,
1
4), we define the strategy σ
ǫ
n as follows:
σǫi,n(ωi) =


σi,n(ωi) if |ωi − eij | > ǫ and |ωi − zi| > ǫ
ǫ−x
ǫ σ
′
i,n(zi) +
x
ǫ σi,n(ωi) if |ωi − zi| = x ≤ ǫ
ǫ−x
ǫ σ
′
i,n(eij) +
x
ǫ σi,n(ωi) if |ωi − eij | = x ≤ ǫ
Note that the payoff vi(σ
ǫ
n, ω) is a continuous function of the signal vector ω. Hence, weak
convergence implies that
Ui(σ
ǫ
n, Hn,k)→ Ui(σ
ǫ
n, Gn) as k →∞.
By construction, we have
Ui(σ
′
n, Gn) > Ui(σn, Gn),
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and
Ui(σ
ǫ
n, Gn)→ Ui(σ
′
n, Gn) as ǫ→ 0.
Since σn is ordinal, the payoff vi(σn, ω) is a continuous function of the signal vector ω. Hence,
weak convergence implies that
Ui(σn, Hn,k)→ Ui(σn, Gn) as k →∞.
Combining these observations, we conclude that for any n, we can find k(n) and ǫ(n) such that
Ui(σ
ǫ(n)
n , Hn,k(n)) > Ui(σn, Hn,k(n)).
To conclude, simply let Fn = Hn,k(n). 
This shows that whenever a routine is indeed strictly optimal for a given distribution of
signals, there exist a sequence of distributions converging to this distribution with the property
that for each distribution in the sequence, the optimal equilibrium is not a routine. As is obvious
from our 2x2x2 uniform-signal example, the converse does not hold. In this sense, routines are
often suboptimal.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we interpret organizational routines as ordinal equilibria in a setting where a
problem-solving team has private signals regarding the most promising action profile and re-
peated opportunities to solve a given problem. We emphasize a variety of properties of these
routines, among them their functioning as solving coordination problems via simple patterns
of behavior, their resilience to changing circumstances, their suboptimality in specific circum-
stances, and their robustness to various behavioral biases. While we believe our model naturally
captures many aspects of organizational routines discussed in the literature, there are others we
do not investigate. So far the literature on organizational behavior has not converged on a sin-
gle definition of organizational routines but it—often verbally—discusses various properties and
benefits thereof. For example, Becker [2004] notes that routines facilitate coordination, avoid
deliberation costs, improve measurability and monitoring, reduce uncertainty, act as repositories
of organizational knowledge and competence, and can serve as reference points for organizational
change. We leave for future research some of the benefits routines have in these regards but we
briefly conjecture here that some of these aspects can be fruitfully analyzed in natural variants
of our model. To do so, we focus completely on the 2x2x2 example of Section 3.
Consider, for example, the claim that routines help reduce deliberation costs. In particular,
consider an application in which each player needs to think hard about how to interpret his
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decentralized knowledge regarding the optimal problem-solving approach—which in the current
setting is summarized in his private signal. In an ordinal equilibrium, players need to only
think about the rank-order of the various signals while in the optimal cardinal equilibrium we
characterize, players in addition have to consider their signal strength in order to contemplate
whether they should switch their chosen action following a first-period failure. If such individual
deliberation is costly, then routines become more desirable.
Routines may also help in collective deliberation. Consider players that discuss beforehand
how to approach upcoming coordination problems, without having seen their signal realization
yet. To solve for the optimal strategy profile, players have to exchange detailed knowledge about
their signal distributions and then find the optimal strategy. Furthermore, whenever the signal
distributions change, player have to reconsider their optimal plan of action. In contrast, far less
detailed information needs to be exchanged for players to agree on a routine, and these rou-
tines remain valid—although they may become suboptimal—even when circumstances change,
thereby potentially significantly reducing the need for future collective deliberation. Analyzing
this question is left for future research.
Next, consider the question whether routines improve measurability and monitoring. Sup-
pose different agents differ in their problem-solving ability in the sense that they have different
signal distributions over which of their action profiles is likely to be part of a success. Then in
a strategy similar to the optimal cardinal equilibrium of the 2x2x2 example, it is hard for an
outside observe to attribute failure even over time.9 On the other hand, when using problem
solving routines, it is potentially easy for an outside observer to learn the probability with which
each agent can identify her more likely action. Whether and under what circumstance routines
help in monitoring is thus an exciting question for future research.
Finally, problem-solving teams with different routines generate different values in our setting.
Since these routines are robust, we can naturally interpret them as part of what defines an
organization and thus as part of its intangible assets. How and when routines (optimally) adapt
in a changing environment is also an interesting question for future research. For example,
organizations that start out with identical optimal routines will experience different success
realizations, and as a result may be prompted at different times to reevaluate their routines in a
changing environment. As a result organizations that start out being identical will at different
times operate with different routines and during those times experience performance differences.
9Also, of course, play in such type of equilibrium would not be static as a player would update her belief as to
what signal distribution characterizes the type of her rival.
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Appendix
Action independence and signal independence
Action independence alone is consistent with perfectly correlated signals about the marginals.
As an examples consider the case of m actions per player and n players who both observe a
common signal that tells them for each of their actions the (marginal) probability that it is part
of a success profile. Unlike in the case we consider in this paper, if the distribution of signals is
atomless, there is an equilibrium that attains ex post efficient exploration with probability one.
Receiving independent signals about the marginals is consistent with violations of action
independence. As an example, consider the case of two players each of whom has three actions
and receives two possible signals, (12 ,
1
2 , 0) or (
1
3 ,
1
3 ,
1
3). The four different combinations of signals
induce for different distributions, indicated as 3× 3-matrices, as follows.
(
1
2
1
2 0
) (
1
3
1
3
1
3
)

 121
2
0



 12 0 00 12 0
0 0 0



 13 0 160 13 16
0 0 0



 131
3
1
3



 13 0 00 13 0
1
6
1
6 0



 19 19 191
9
1
9
1
9
1
9
1
9
1
9


Here, unlike in the case we consider in the paper, if the game has maximally three time periods,
then there exists an ex post efficient equilibrium: First take action 1, then action 2; if both players
received the signal (12 ,
1
2 , 0) the success has been found; otherwise the player who received signal
(12 ,
1
2 , 0) repeats the same two actions and the player who received a signal (
1
3 ,
1
3 ,
1
3) takes the
third action.
Existence of LH-equilibria
Any candidate LH-equilibrium must satisfy equation (5). Consider equation (5) with i = 1.
Integrating the left- hand side yields
LHS :=
1
8
c1 + c1c2 − c1c
2
2 −
1
8
c1δ +
1
2
c1c
2
2δ,
and by integrating the right-hand side, we obtain
RHS =
1
8
+ c2 − c
2
2 − c1
(
1
8
+ c2 − c
2
2 −
3
8
δ
)
.
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Now solve the equation LHS = RHS for c1 as a function of c2 and δ. This produces
c1 =
1 + 8c2 − 8c
2
2
2− 4δ + 16c2 − 16c22 + 4δc
2
2
.
One obtains the corresponding expression for c2 by everywhere exchanging the subscripts.
c2 =
1 + 8c1 − 8c
2
1
2− 4δ + 16c1 − 16c21 + 4δc
2
1
.
Multiply both sides of the last equation by the denominator of the expression on the right-hand
side to obtain:
(2− 4δ + 16c1 − 16c
2
1 + 4δc
2
1)c2 = 1 + 8c1 − 8c
2
1.
Use N to denote the numerator in the expression for c1 and D to denote the corresponding
denominator. Substitute ND for c1 in the last equation, multiply both sides by D
2 and subtract
the right-hand side from both sides to obtain:
(2D2 + 16DN − 16N2 − 4δD2 + 4δN2)c2 − (D
2 + 8DN − 8N2) = 0.
Substituting for N and D results in:
Φ(c2, δ) ≡ −4(3− 12δ + 4δ
2 + c22(48 + 348δ − 136δ
2) + 12c42(80− 56δ + 11δ
2)
+ 8c52(−48 + 48δ − 17δ
2 + 2δ3)
− 8c32(84− 3δ − 20δ
2 + 4δ3) + c2(42− 69δ − 24δ
2 + 16δ3)) = 0
To analyze the polynomial Φ(c2, δ), we will make use of its derivative with respect to c2,
which is given by:
Ψ(c2, δ) ≡ −4(42− 69δ − 24δ
2 + 16δ3 + 2c2(48 + 348δ − 136δ
2) + 48c32(80− 56δ + 11δ
2)
+ 40c42(−48 + 48δ − 17δ
2 + 2δ3)− 24c22(84− 3δ − 20δ
2 + 4δ3))
Note the following facts:
1.
Φ(c2 = −1, δ) = 2700(δ − 3)
Ψ(c2 = −1, δ) = 60(522− 261δ + 32δ
2);
i.e., Φ is negative and increasing at c2 = −1 for all δ ∈ (0, 1).
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2.
Φ(c2 = 1, δ) = 12(1− δ);
i.e., Φ is positive at c2 = 1 for all δ ∈ (0, 1).
3.
Φ(c2 =
1
2
, δ) = −18δ(3− 4δ + δ2)) = −18δ(3− δ)(1− δ);
i.e., Φ is negative at c2 =
1
2 for all δ ∈ (0, 1).
4. The factor that multiplies the highest power of c2 in Φ(c2, δ) equals −4(−48+48δ−17δ
2+
2δ3) and therefore is positive for all δ. Hence, Φ(c2, δ) is positive and grows without bound
for sufficiently large values of c2.
5.
Ψ(c2 =
1
5
, δ) = −
12
125
(342 + 2277δ − 2336δ2 + 512δ3);
i.e., the derivative of Φ is negative at c2 =
1
5 for all δ ∈ (0, 1).
6.
Ψ
(
c2 =
75
100
, δ
)
= 30 + 132δ −
1587δ2
8
+
203δ3
4
> 30 + 132δ − 200δ2 + 51δ3
= 132δ(1− δ) + [30− 68δ2 + 51δ3]
> 0
7.
Ψ(c2 = 1, δ) = −4(42− 69δ + 32δ
2).
Since 42 − 69δ + 32δ2 does not have real roots and is positive at δ = 0, the derivative of
Φ at c2 = 1 is negative for all δ ∈ (0, 1)
Facts 1 and 5 imply that Φ has a local extremum in the the interval (−1, 15). Facts 5 and 6
imply that Φ has a local extremum in the the interval (15 ,
75
100). Facts 6 an 7 imply that Φ has
a local extremum in the the interval ( 75100 , 1). Facts 4 and 7 imply that Φ has a local extremum
in the the interval (1,∞). Since Φ is a 5th-order polynomial, this accounts for all of its local
extrema and rules out stationary points that are not local extrema.
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Facts 2 and 7 imply that Φ achieves a local maximum, γ, in the the interval ( 75100 , 1). This
and fact 7 imply that Φ is positive in the interval [γ, 1]. Fact 3, the observation that there is a
local extremum in (15 ,
75
100) and the fact that there are exactly two extrema in the interval (
1
5 , 1)
imply that there is a local minimum γ in (15 ,
75
100). If γ ≤
1
2 , then, since Φ has no stationary
points that are not extrema, it must be strictly increasing in the interval [12 , γ] and therefore
has a unique root in this interval and since Φ is positive on [γ, 1], it has a unique root on [12 , 1].
If 12 < γ, then Φ is decreasing and by fact 3 negative on the interval [
1
2 , γ], is strictly increasing
on the interval [γ, γ] and positive on the interval [γ, 1] from the argument given above. Hence,
it has a unique root in the interval [12 , 1].
In any candidate LH-equilibrium the equation Φ(ci, δ) = 0 has to hold for both i = 1 and
i = 2. Since this equation has a unique solution, it has to be symmetric. Using symmetry, it
suffices to solve one of the two equations for equilibrium cutoffs in terms of a common value c,
i.e. c must satisfy
∫ 1
c
cβdβ +
∫ c
1
2
[cβδ + c(1− β)] dβ =
∫ 1
c
[cβδ + (1− c)β] dβ +
∫ c
1
2
[cβδ + (1− c)(1− β)] dβ,
which is equivalent to
1 + c(6 + 4δ)− 24c2 + c3(16− 4δ) = 0
Solve this for δ to obtain δ as a function of c
δ =
1 + 6c− 24c2 + 16c3
4c(−1 + c2)
The derivative of δ with respect to c equals
1
8
(
1
(−1 + c)2
+
2
c2
+
45
(1 + c)2
)
which is positive. Since δ(1/2) = 0 and the δ-function is strictly increasing for all c < 1, its
invertible. Hence, the candidate solution c(δ) is increasing.
To verify that that the candidate solution c(δ) is indeed an equilibrium for a given value of
δ, it remains to verify that inequality (6) is satisfied by the symmetric cutoff c. As we showed
earlier, this amounts to δ > δ∗ where δ∗ ≈ 0.861276.
Existence of mixed equilibria
We show existence of equilibria in which there is a common cutoff c and common mixing
probability ξ such that both player use HH for signals above the cutoff and mix for signals
below the cutoff, putting probability ξ on LH and 1− ξ on HL. Such equilibria exist if and only
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if there is an LH equilibrium. The proof proceeds in two steps. First, we show that for any
given mixing probability ξ′ there exists a cutoff c(ξ′) that makes players indifferent at the cutoff
between following the sequences HH and LH. Second, we show that if (and only if) there is an
LH equilibrium, there is a unique mixing probability ξ such that if players use the cutoff c(ξ),
they are indifferent between LH and HL for all signals.
Player 1’s payoff from using the action sequence HH when his signal is α and player 2 plays
HH for signals β above c, plays LH with probability ξ and HL with probability 1− ξ for signals
below c, equals
HH(α; ξ, c) = 2
∫ 1
c
αβdβ + 2
∫ c
1
2
ξ [α(1− β) + αβδ] + (1− ξ) [αβ + α(1− β)δ] dβ.
If player 1 uses the action sequence LH instead, his payoff under the same conditions equals
LH(α; ξ, c) = 2
∫ 1
c
[(1− α)β + δαβ]dβ
+ 2
∫ c
1
2
ξ [(1− α)(1− β) + αβδ] + (1− ξ) [(1− α)β + α(1− β)δ] dβ.
In equilibrium these payoffs have to be equal to each other at the equilibrium cutoff. Therefore,
let us look at the (scaled) difference between these payoffs when player 1’s signal α equals player
2’s cutoff c:
Ψ(ξ, c) ≡
1
2
[HH(c; ξ, c)− LH(c; ξ, c)]
= (2c− 1− δc)
∫ 1
c
βdβ +
∫ c
1
2
ξ [(2c− 1)(1− β)] + (1− ξ) [(2c− 1)β] dβ.
It is straightforward to check the following three properties of the function Ψ: Ψ(ξ, 12) =
−δ 12
∫ 1
1
2
βdβ < 0 ∀ξ ∈ [0, 1]; Ψ(ξ, 1) =
∫ 1
1
2
ξ(1 − β) + (1 − ξ)βdβ > 0 ∀ξ ∈ [0, 1]; and, Ψ(ξ, c) is
continuous in c for all ξ. Therefore, by the intermediate value theorem, for all ξ ∈ [0, 1] there
exists a c(ξ) ∈
(
1
2 , 1
)
such that Ψ(ξ, c(ξ)) = 0.
Note that at any solution c(ξ) of the equation Ψ(ξ, c) = 0, we must have (2c(ξ)−1−δc(ξ)) < 0.
From this fact it follows that ∂Ψ(ξ, c(ξ))/∂c > 0 for all ξ ∈ [0, 1]. This and the fact that Ψ is
continuously differentiable implies that for any ξ ∈ [0, 1] the solution c(ξ) is unique. (To see
this in more detail, suppose first that the set of solutions has an accumulation point c∗(ξ), i.e.
all open neighborhoods of c∗(ξ) contain a solution other than c∗(ξ). By continuity of Ψ, c∗(ξ)
is itself a solution and therefore ∂Ψ(ξ, c∗(ξ))/∂c > 0. This, however, is inconsistent with c∗(ξ)
being an accumulation point of the set of solutions. This implies that for every point there is a
sufficiently small open neighborhood that contains no more than finitely many solutions. This
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implies that every compact interval of R contains only finitely many solutions. Now suppose
that there are at least two solutions, c1 and c2 > c1, and consider a compact interval I that
contains c1 and c2. Since there are only finitely many solutions in I, the set of solutions c that
satisfy c > c1 has a smallest element, c˜. Since ∂Ψ(ξ, c1)/∂c > 0 and ∂Ψ(ξ, c˜)/∂c > 0, there exist
c′ and c′′ with c1 < c
′ < c′′ < c˜ such that Ψ(ξ, c′) > 0 and Ψ(ξ, c′′) < 0. But then continuity of Ψ
and the intermediate value theorem imply that there is a solution in the interval (c1, c˜), which
contradicts the definition of c˜.) By the implicit function theorem for any ξ ∈ [0, 1] there exists
an ǫ(ξ) > 0 such that c(ξ) is continuously differentiable for all ξ′ with |ξ′ − ξ| < ǫ(ξ). Since this
is true for all ξ ∈ [0, 1], c(ξ) is continuously differentiable for all ξ ∈ [0, 1].
It remains to show that there is a mixing probability ξ of player 2 that for all signals α makes
player 1 indifferent between the action sequences LH and HL when player 2 uses the cutoff c(ξ).
We first show this for α = 1 and will argue below that this suffices. Player 1’s payoff from action
sequence LH, given signal α = 1 against a player 2 who mixes with probability ξ and uses cutoff
c(ξ) equals
LH(1; ξ, c(ξ)) =
∫ 1
c(ξ)
δβdβ +
∫ c(ξ)
1
2
ξ [βδ] + (1− ξ) [(1− β)δ] dβ.
Given the same signals and strategy of player 2, player 1’s payoff from the sequence HL equals
HL(1; ξ, c(ξ)) =
∫ 1
c(ξ)
βdβ +
∫ c(ξ)
1
2
ξ [(1− β)δ] + (1− ξ) [(βδ] dβ.
Note that both functions are continuous in ξ. Next evaluate both functions at ξ = 0,
LH(1, 0, c(0)) =
∫ 1
c(0)
δβdβ +
∫ c(0)
1
2
[(1− β)δ] dβ,
HL(1; 0, c(0)) =
∫ 1
c(0)
βdβ +
∫ c(0)
1
2
[(βδ] dβ,
and observe that LH(1, 0, c(0)) < HL(1, 0, c(0)).
It remains to examine both functions at ξ = 1. Recall that by construction,HH(c(1); 1, c(1)) =
LH(c(1), 1, c(1)). If in addition we have LH(c(1); 1, c(1)) ≥ HL(c(1), 1, c(1)), then c(1) is the
equilibrium cutoff in an LH equilibrium. The condition LH(c(1); 1, c(1)) ≥ HL(c(1), 1, c(1)) is,
however, equivalent to LH(1; 1, c(1)) ≥ HL(1, 1, c(1)) because LH(c
(
1
2
)
; 1, c(1)) = HL(c
(
1
2
)
, 1, c(1))
and the functions LH(α; 1, c(1)) and HL(α, 1, c(1)) are affine in α. Thus, the intermediate value
theorem implies that such a mixed equilibrium exists whenever there is an LH equilibrium (and
it differs from the LH- equilibrium whenever LH(c(1); 1, c(1)) > HL(c(1), 1, c(1))).
Conversely, if there is no LH equilibrium, then LH(1; 1, c(1)) < HL(1, 1, c(1)). Note that
LH(1; ξ, c(ξ))−HL(1; ξ, c(ξ)) =
∫ 1
c(ξ)
(δ − 1)βdβ +
∫ c(ξ)
1
2
(2ξ − 1)δ(2β − 1)dβ
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Since ∂Ψ(ξ, c)/∂ξ =
∫ c
1
2
[(2c− 1)(1− 2β)] dβ < 0 and, as we showed above, ∂Ψ(ξ, c(ξ))/∂c > 0,
we have c′(ξ) > 0. Therefore LH(1; ξ, c(ξ)) < HL(1; ξ, c(ξ)) for all ξ ∈ (0, 1), and thus there is
no mixed equilibrium of this type when there is no LH equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 11:
We prove this result by showing that it suffices to limit the search for an optimal profile to a
restricted class of strategy profiles, that this class is compact and that the payoff is continuous
in this class. For notational convenience, we use ωi and ωi interchangeably to denote player i’s
signal in this proof.
As a preliminary step, we first note that the sets of optimal and of Nash equilibrium profiles
can be analyzed in terms of mappings from signals to distributions over action sequences. Since
player i has mi actions, he can follow one of
(
mi
)T
possible action sequences in the T -period
game. We denote a typical action sequence of this kind for player i by λi and the set of such
action sequences for player i by Λi. We show below that in the present environment the sets
of optimal and of Nash equilibrium profiles can be fully characterized in terms of the action-
sequence mappings χi : Ωi → ∆(Λi).
This follows from the following four observations: (1) Any strategy σi induces an action-
sequence mapping χi|σi that assigns the same probability to action sequences as does σi. Con-
versely, (2) for any action-sequence mapping χ˜i we can find a strategy σ˜i for player i such that
χ˜i = χi|σ˜i. Then (3) if χj |σj = χj |τj for all j 6= i and σi is a best reply to σ−i, then σi is
also a best reply to τ−i; and, (4) any strategy τi with χi|τi = χi|σi is also a best reply to σ−i
and τ−i. Thus for any optimal strategy profile σ there exists an action-sequence mapping χ|σ
that induces the same payoff and conversely for any action sequence mapping χ there exists a
strategy profile that induces that mapping. Similarly, for any Nash equilibrium σ the profile of
action-sequences χ|σ retains all relevant information about σ in the sense that any other strategy
profile τ with χ|τ is a Nash equilibrium that induces the same outcome. Conversely, for any
profile χ of action-sequence mappings we can check the best-reply property of Nash equilibrium
directly, without specifying strategies σi beyond the requirement that they induce χi.
For observation (1) note that for any behaviorally mixed strategy σi the action-sequence
mapping χi that is defined by
χi((ai(1), . . . , ai(T ))|ωi) := σi(ai(1)|ωi)×σi(ai(2)|ai(1), ωi)×. . .×σi(ai(T )|ai(1), . . . , ai(T−1), ωi)
for all action sequences (ai(1)), . . . , ai(T )) assigns the same probabilities to action sequences.
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For observation (2) note that for given χi any behaviorally mixed strategy that satisfies
σi(ai(t)|ai(1), . . . , ai(t− 1), ωi) =
∑
{λi|λi(t′)=ai(t′),t′≤t}
χi(λi|ωi)∑
{λi|λi(t′)=ai(t′),t′≤t−1}
χi(λi|ωi)
assigns the same probability to action sequences. Observation (3) follows from the fact that
an action sequence, despite not being a fully specified strategy, does fully determine behavior
after all histories that can be induced by other players. Hence, when player i deviates his rivals
action-sequence mappings fully determine their response to i’s deviation. Finally, observation
(4) is a simple consequence of the fact that in the present setting any two strategies of player
i that induce the same action-sequence mappings induce the same outcome and therefore the
same payoff for player i.
Definition A1 If there exists a finite partition of the signal space of player i such that his
strategy σi prescribes the same action sequence everywhere on the interior of a given partition
element, σi is a partition strategy.
Definition A2 A convex-partition strategy is a partition strategy based on a partition all of
whose elements are convex.
Since player i has mi actions, he can follow one of
(
mi
)T
possible action sequences in the
T -period game. Let λit be the action taken by player i in period t given his action sequence λ
i.
Each player i’s strategy can be viewed as a function that maps his signal ωi into a distribution
over action sequences λi. Accordingly, we use σi
λi
(
ωi
)
to denote the probability that player i
plays action sequence λi after observing the signal ωi. ωi
λit
denotes the probability that player
i’s signal ωi assigns to the period-t element of his action sequence λi.
Since we have a common-interest game, we can focus on player 1 as representative for all other
players. Denote the joint signal distribution of all players other than player 1 by H
(
ω2, . . . , ωN
)
.
Then player 1’s payoff in the T -period game as a function of his chosen action sequence λ1, his
signal ω1 and the strategies of other players σ−1 equals
π
(
λ1, ω1;σ−1
)
=∫ ∑
λ2
. . .
∑
λN
(
σ2λ2
(
ω2
)
× . . .× σNλN
(
ωN
))
×
{
ω1λ11
. . . ωN
λN1
+ δω1λ12
. . . ωN
λN2
1{(λ12,λ22,...,λN2 ) 6=(λ11,λ21,...,λN1 )}
+ . . .
+δTω1λ1
T
. . . ωT
λN
T
1{(λ1T ,λ
2
T
,...,λN
T )/∈{(λ
1
1,λ
2
1,...,λ
N
1 ),...,(λ1T−1,λ
2
T−1,...,λ
N
T−1)}}
}
dH
(
ω2, . . . , ωN
)
Inspection of the above payoff function yields the following observation:
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Lemma A1 Player i’s payoffs are linear in player i’s signal ωi, for any given strategies σ−i of
other players and any action sequence λi =
(
λi1, . . . , λ
i
T
)
of player i.
Next we show that Lemma A1 implies that any strategy profile can be replaced by a convex-
partition strategy profile with an at least equally high payoff. Moreover, the latter profile can
be described via a bounded number of points.
Lemma A2 For any strategy profile σ, there exists a profile of convex-partition strategies σ˜
such that π (σ˜) ≥ π (σ) and in which each element of player i’s partition is a convex polytope
with at most M i vertices, where M i ≡
((mi)T−1+mi
mi−1
)
.
Proof: Take σ−i as given. Since player i’s payoff from a given action sequence λ
i is linear in
his signal ωi, the set of signals for which a given action profile is optimal satisfies
(
(mi)T − 1
)
linear inequalities that ensure that the payoff from λi is higher than from that from any other
action sequence λ˜i; an additional mi inequalities and one equation ensure that the set of signals
is a subset of the (mi− 1)-dimensional unit simplex. Note that in the mi− 1 dimensional signal
space, a vertex is defined by at least mi− 1 equations. Therefore, in this space an upper bound
on the number of vertices of a polytope that is characterized by k > mi − 1 inequalities is(
k
mi−1
)
. Thus, the set of signals for which a given action profile is optimal must be a convex
polytope with at most
((mi)T−1+mi
mi−1
)
= M i vertices. Hence, there exists a best response to σ−i
that partitions the signal space of player i into convex polytopes each of which have at most M i
vertices.
Take any strategy profile σ. Since the set of best responses of player 1 always includes a
convex-partition strategy in which each element of player 1’s partition is a convex polytope with
at most M1 vertices, we can replace σ1 by such a convex-partition strategy σ˜1 without lowering
payoffs. We then have a strategy profile given by σ′ = (σ˜1, σ−i). By the same argument as
above, we can replace player 2’s strategy with a convex partition strategy σ˜2 in which each
element of player 2’s partition is a convex polytope with at most M2 vertices, again without
lowering payoffs. Iterating, we get a convex-partition strategy profile σ˜ such that π (σ˜) ≥ π (σ)
and in which each element of player i’s partition is a polytope with at most M i vertices. 
Proof: (of Proposition 11) Let π := sup{σ∈ΣT } π(σ) and note that π < 1. Consider a sequence
of strategy profiles σn that satisfies limn→∞ π(σn) = π. By Lemma A2, for each strategy profile
σn in the sequence, we can find a profile of convex-partition strategies σ˜n with π(σ˜n) ≥ π(σn).
Evidently, the sequence σ˜n satisfies limn→∞ π(σ˜n) = π.
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Each convex-partition profile σ˜n can be represented as a point in a compact Euclidian space:
Recall that player i has (mi)T possible action sequences. A convex-partition strategy of player
i assigns each of those action sequences to the interior of a convex polytope with at most
M i =
((mi)T−1+mi
mi−1
)
elements. Therefore, a convex-partition strategy of player i can be viewed
as a point in the set Ξi := ∆
(mi−1)×M i×((mi)T−1), where the first mi − 1 components describe
a point in the signal space, the second mi − 1 components describe a point in the signal space
and so on; the first M i such points are the vertices of the convex polytope on which player i
uses his first action sequence (if the convex polytope assigned to the action sequence has less
than M i vertices, simply repeat one of the vertices; if it has empty interior, the corresponding
action sequence is not used with positive probability), likewise the kthM i-tuple of mi−1-tuples
corresponds to the vertices of the convex polytope on which player i uses his kth action sequence;
it suffices to specify the convex polytopes associated with ((mi)T − 1) action sequences, because
the convex polytope associated with the remaining action sequence is specified by default.
Hence, there exists a convergent subsequence σ˜nk . Denote the limit of this sequence by σ
and note that σ is a convex-partition strategy profile. For any ǫ ∈ (0, 1) and for each player
i, we can find a closed subset Φi(ǫ) of the signal space such that all elements of Φi(ǫ) belong
to the interior of elements of the partition induced by σi and the probability that i’s signal
is in Φi(ǫ) satisfies Prob{Φi(ǫ)} > 1 − ǫ. Since the boundary of each partition element varies
continuously with the vertices defining that element, we also have that for large k everywhere
on Φi(ǫ), the strategy profiles σ and σ˜nk induce the same action sequence. Hence, the profiles of
action sequences induced by the two strategy profiles differ with as most probability 1− (1− ǫ)I .
Since the maximum payoff difference from any two strategy profiles is bounded, this implies that
the expected payoff from the profile σ must equal π. 
A Signal Strength Strategy Representation
In the main body of the text, we argued that formally a behavioral strategy for player i in the
2 × 2 × 2 example maps signals ωi1 into three probabilities: (1) p
i
1(ωi1), (2) q
i
1(ωi1), and (3)
qi2(ωi1). We next prove that any given behavioral strategy (p
i
1(ωi1), q
i
1(ωi1), q
i
2(ωi1)) of player
i induces a payoff-equivalent strategy (pi(α), qih(α), q
i
l(α)) that conditions only on the signal
strength, where the payoff equivalence holds for any given strategy of player j and any given
signal realization ωj .
To see this, consider two different signals ω′i1 and ω
′′
i1 that give rise to the same α. Without
loss of generality, suppose that ω′i1 identifies action 1 as the high-probability action so that
α = ω′i1 = 1 − ω
′′
i1. Given signal and action independence, the success probabilities of action
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profiles for the signal realizations (ω′i, ωj) and (ω
′′
i , ωj) equal:
Signal Realization (ω′i, ωj)
aj1 aj2
ai1 αωj1 α(1− ωj1)
ai2 (1− α)ωj1 (1− α)(1− ωj1)
Signal Realization (ω′′i , ωj)
aj1 aj2
ai1 αωj1 α(1− ωj1)
ai2 (1− α)ωj1 (1− α)(1− ωj1)
Success Probabilities of Action Profiles for the case α = ω′i1 = 1− ω
′′
i1
Since conditional on having signal strength α both ω′i and ω
′′
i are equally likely, player i’s
expected payoff when following strategy (pi1(ωi1), q
i
1(ωi1), q
i
2(ωi1)) conditional on having signal
strength α is equal to:
pi1(ω
′
i1) + (1− p
i
1(ω
′′
i1))
2
pj1(ωj1)αωj1 +
pi1(ω
′
i1) + (1− p
i
1(ω
′′
i1))
2
(1− pj1(ωj1))α(1− ωj1)
+
(1− pi1(ω
′
i1)) + p
i
1(ω
′′
i1)
2
pj1(ωj1)(1− α)ωj1 +
(1− pi1(ω
′
i1)) + p
i
1(ω
′′
i1)
2
(1− pj1(ωj1))(1− α)(1− ωj1)
+δ
pi1(ω
′
i1) + (1− p
i
1(ω
′′
i1))
2
pj1(ωj1){[
qi1(ω
′
i1) + (1− q
i
2(ω
′′
i1))
]
qj1(ωj1) 0 +
[
qi1(ω
′
i1) + (1− q
i
2(ω
′′
i1))
]
(1− qj1(ωj1))α(1− ωj1)
+
[
(1− qi1(ω
′
i1)) + q
i
2(ω
′′
i1))
]
qj1(ωj1)(1− α)ωj1 +
[
(1− qi1(ω
′
i1)) + q
i
2(ω
′′
i1))
]
(1− qj1(ωj1))(1− α)(1− ωj1)
}
+δ
pi1(ω
′
i1) + (1− p
i
1(ω
′′
i1))
2
(1− pj1(ωj1)){[
qi1(ω
′
i1) + (1− q
i
2(ω
′′
i1))
]
qj2(ωj1)αωj1 +
[
qi1(ω
′
i1) + (1− q
i
2(ω
′′
i1))
]
(1− qj2(ωj1))0
+
[
(1− qi1(ω
′
i1)) + q
i
2(ω
′′
i1))
]
qj2(ωj1)(1− α)ωj1 +
[
(1− qi1(ω
′
i1)) + q
i
2(ω
′′
i1))
]
(1− qj2(ωj1))(1− α)(1− ωj1)
}
+δ
(1− pi1(ω
′
i1)) + p
i
1(ω
′′
i1)
2
pj1(ωj1){[
qi2(ω
′
i1) + (1− q
i
1(ω
′′
i1))
]
qj1(ωj1)αωj1 +
[
qi2(ω
′
i1) + (1− q
i
1(ω
′′
i1))
]
(1− qj1(ωj1))α(1− ωj1)
+
[
(1− qi2(ω
′
i1)) + q
i
1(ω
′′
i1))
]
qj1(ωj1) 0 +
[
(1− qi2(ω
′
i1)) + q
i
1(ω
′′
i1))
]
(1− qj1(ωj1))(1− α)(1− ωj1)
}
+δ
(1− pi1(ω
′
i1)) + p
i
1(ω
′′
i1)
2
(1− pj1(ωj1)){[
qi2(ω
′
i1) + (1− q
i
1(ω
′′
i1))
]
qj2(ωj1)αωj1 +
[
qi2(ω
′
i1) + (1− q
i
1(ω
′′
i1))
]
(1− qj2(ωj1))α(1− ωj1)
+
[
(1− qi2(ω
′
i1)) + q
i
1(ω
′′
i1))
]
qj2(ωj1)(1− α)ωj1 +
[
(1− qi2(ω
′
i1)) + q
i
1(ω
′′
i1))
]
(1− qj2(ωj1)) 0
}
.
Recalling that for signal ω′i action ai1 and for signal ω
′′
i action ai2 is the high probability action,
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we can define a strategy that conditions only on signal strength α by setting
pi(α) =
pi1(ω
′
i1) + (1− p
i
1(ω
′′
i1))
2
qih(α) =
qi1(ω
′
i1) + (1− q
i
2(ω
′′
i1))
2
qil(α) =
qi2(ω
′
i1) + (1− q
i
1(ω
′′
i1))
2
.
Mere inspection of the above expected payoff formulae verifies that both strategies induce the
same expected payoff. Similarly, any (pi(α), qih(α), q
i
l(α)) can be converted into a a behavioral
strategy (pi1(ωi1), q
i
1(ωi1), q
i
2(ωi1)) by simply setting p
i
1(ω
′
i1) = (1 − p
i
1(ω
′′
i1)) = p
i(α), qi1(ω
′
i1) =
(1 − qi2(ω
′′
i1)) = q
i
h(α), and q
i
2(ω
′
i1) = (1 − q
i
1(ω
′′
i1)) = q
i
l(α). Of course, whenever one of the
probabilities pi(α), qih(α), and q
i
l(α) lies in the open interval (0, 1) there are multiple behavioral
strategies (pi1(ωi1), q
i
1(ωi1), q
i
2(ωi1)) that correspond to the same signal strength strategy and
induces the same expected payoff; intuitively, a player can use the fact whether action 1 or
action 2 is the high-probability action as a private randomization device in such cases.
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